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Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral
Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and
Consistent Jurisprudence
Jeffrey W. Stempel*
infatuate 1: to cause to be foolish: deprive of soundjudgment 2: to
inspire with afoolish or extravagantlove or admiration.'
love la(1): a strong affection for another arising out of kinship or
personal ties .. . (3): affection based on admiration, benevolence, or
common interests.. . 2: warm attachment, enthusiasm, or
devotion ... 3a: the object of attachment, devotion, or admiration.2
I.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT KIND OF "LOVE" IS THIS?

Collectively, the U.S. Supreme Court, even if not "in love" with
arbitration, appears to at least have a serious attachment to arbitration,
subject to revision only in the service of other questionable preferences,
such as support for the comparatively richer and more powerful litigant.
In that sense, the Court's pronounced, but intellectually inconsistent,
preferences for arbitration reflect a reckless, impure, or tainted love
rather than the type of mature, realistic affection society generally sets
forth as exemplary. The Court has an unrealistically sanguine view of
the wonders of arbitration-so sanguine that it is willing in most cases to
* Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Doris Lee, Ted Lee, Ann McGinley, Jim Rogers, and
John White as well as to David McClure, Jennifer Anderson, Sabrina Dolson, Elizabeth Ellison, and
Jeanne Price for valuable research assistance. Thanks also to Stephen Ware, Christopher Drahozal,
and the University ofKansas Law Review for arranging this symposium and its resulting papers.
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 597 (10th ed. 1996).

2. Id. at 690. The dictionary definition of "love" has been edited to exclude, among other
irrelevant definitions, "attraction based on sexual desire." See id. at 690.
3. A case can be made that in arbitration cases the Court is being dispassionately calculating in
its result-orientation and disregard for its professed polestars of sound judicial decision-making. If
this is the case, then the Court's performance in arbitration cases is even more contemptible in that it
implies blatant misuse of judicial power rather than merely being led astray by arbitration's overall
popularity.
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impose arbitration in situations far exceeding those envisioned by the
drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act 4 and despite significant issues of
states' rights, the quality of contract consent, the fairness of the
arbitration tribunal, and the overall operation of the dispute resolution
system. But at crucial junctures, the Court strains to rein in arbitration
when concerned that the arbitration might reach results the Court dislikes
or come to resemble litigation-particularly aggregate litigation.
During the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to
arbitration disputes has been more than just mere affection for
arbitration, but it has also lacked the nuanced understanding and realistic
appraisal associated with true love. Rather, the Court's arbitration
decisions have reflected something more like a crush or obsession that
tends to distort judgment, much as a person in the grip of infatuation
views the object of that affection as though it has no faults and with
blinders as to the contextual realities surrounding this outpouring of often
This uncritical amore for arbitration-and a
one-sided emotion.5
corresponding, if subconscious, derogation of litigation, at least if
resorted to by consumers or employees-has produced a body of Federal
Arbitration Act jurisprudence that has been something far short of the
U.S. Supreme Court's finest hour.
But at the same time, the Court has resembled the suitor-or perhaps
an overbearing parent having "birthed" an expansion of mandatory
arbitration -in that it loves something only when it does what is
expected. The Court loves arbitration, but only when arbitration
functions as the Court thinks it should. Where arbitration seeks to
embrace class-wide solutions to disputes, the Court's amore turns almost
to anger.7 In fact, it seems that the only time the Court does not make

4. 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2006). The Court in its decisions often uses the short form "FAA" for
the Act, which is grating and even confusing. Prior to the modern era of substantial Supreme Court
arbitration jurisprudence, the acronym FAA was synonymous with "Federal Aviation
Administration," and so it will remain in this article, where the Federal Arbitration Act will be
referred to as the "Act" or the "Arbitration Act."
5. This Article talks of the "Court" primarily as a matter of shorthand, recognizing of course
that many of the Court's arbitration decisions have divided the Justices, including some 5-4 votes on
important issues. To be sure, some Justices are not under the spell of arbitration, but the Court as a
whole has been under such a spell from approximately the mid-1980s to the present.
6. See infra notes 167-287 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's mid-1980s move
from viewing the Arbitration Act as setting procedural law for federal courts to treating the act as
substantive federal law).
7. See infra notes 355-74, 386-423 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011)).
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figurative goo-goo eyes about the wonder of arbitration is when the
Court thinks that arbitration has become too close to litigation by seeking
class-wide treatment of disputes,8 which is something largely opposed by
the business community with which the Court is arguably even more
infatuated. 9
The Court's embrace of arbitration suggests both infatuation and
fickleness. Infatuation, at least in adjudication, is perhaps something
worse than blind or even erratic love in that infatuation connotes the type
8. In Concepcion, the Court did both. See supra notes 386-423 and accompanying text Itrather, five out of nine of its Justices-lavishly praised arbitration while simultaneously suggesting
that all of these wonderful attributes of arbitration were eradicated if the arbitration involved classwide treatment of a dispute. See notes 386-423 and accompanying text.
9. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION
(2010) (noting the degree to which the Court in recent years has favored business litigants and
results generally regarded as ideologically and politically conservative); J. Mitchell Pickerill,
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1063, 1063 (2009) ("Since John Roberts assumed the Chief Justiceship, the proportion of the docket
devoted to business litigation appears to have increased; outcomes seem more likely to favor
business interests; and the Court seems to be more consensual in its pro-business decisions, with
divisions seemingly defying the expected conservative-liberal blocs."); Jeffrey Rosen, Big Business
and the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 929, 932-34 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme
Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2008, at MM38; David G. Savage, High Court Is Good for
Business, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al; David G. Savage, Supreme Court Gives Firms a
Stronger Hand, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at BI ("The Supreme Court, which winds up its term
Monday, has once again shown itself to be highly skeptical of large lawsuits against big business,
regardless of whether the suits are intended to protect workers, consumers or the environment.").
Dean Chemerinsky in fact uses the practical impact of the Court's arbitration cases as an
example of unreasonable, pro-business jurisprudence. See CHEMERINSKY, supra, at 227-31
(criticizing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)); infra notes 320-28 and
accompanying text (discussing Circuit City). As Dean Chemerinsky explained:
Several years ago, I bought a new computer from Dell. I was about to teach the
material on arbitration to my first-year civil procedure class and decided to read the fine
print that came with the agreement accompanying the computer. There was a clause that
said that by buying the computer and by turning it on, I was agreeing that any dispute that
I would have with Dell would go to arbitration and not to a jury trial. I sent a letter back
to Dell saying, "I do not consent to this and by opening my letter you hereby consent that
I can take you to court." I am pleased to report that the computer worked fine and that I
had no occasion for suing Dell.
[This example and another given earlier in the book] are illustrations of a national
trend toward businesses demanding arbitration whenever possible and rejecting courts
and jury trials. . ..

Yale law professor Judith Resnik has documented . .. [that] businesses prefer
arbitration . . . [in part because there is] an institutionalized bias among arbiters in favor
of repeat players in the system.. ..
... [T]he Supreme Court has been pushing matters to arbitration when there is no such
agreement between the parties.
Id. at 227-28 (discussing Circuit City as an example of a poorly reasoned arbitration decision unfair
to workers).
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of head-over-heels, uncritically high regard or worship one associates
with an immature "crush" or the placing of an object of affection on a
figurative pedestal. But just as the infatuated might take a 180-degree
turn against an object of affection, during the past two Terms the Court
has taken such a turn, restricting the scope of arbitration in the face of
objections by the economically powerful.' 0
Although the Court has been enamored of arbitration for three
decades, the Court's love of arbitration took a distinctly tainted turn
under the Roberts Court. Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
worked a sea change in the law with their elevation of the status of
mandatory binding arbitration," there were at least moments of caution
and care as those Courts on occasion attempted-albeit highly
imperfectly-to fairly apply the controlling statute, the Federal
Arbitration Act.12 By contrast, the Roberts Court appears to have shed
any fidelity to the rules of statutory construction, civil litigation, or
judicial neutrality in promoting arbitration-except when arbitration is at
odds with the interests of a more economically favored and powerful
litigant. "

Fifteen years ago, the Court's preference for arbitration was so
pronounced that I described it as an "infatuation" in which the Court

10. See infra notes 355-74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen); infra notes 386423, and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion).
I1. Some scholars take the view that a standardized pre-dispute arbitration agreements
contained in a contract of adhesion is not a "mandatory" binding arbitration agreement but simply a
consensual contract. The view expressed in this Article is to the contrary. When courts enforce a
standardized arbitration agreement that is part of a take-it-or-leave-it transaction, relatively hidden in
the documentation of the transaction and not negotiated by the parties, the arbitration clause is not so
much a contractual agreement as a required term of a transaction (e.g., borrowing funds, buying a
cell phone) or relationship (e.g., employment). At least this is true so long as courts tend to give
short shrift to the issue of whether the party adhering to the arbitration clause really "agreed" to the
clause. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1381, 1430 (1996) [hereinafter Stempel,
Bootstrapping and Slouching] (noting judicial reluctance to seriously examine issues of consent to
arbitration clauses); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrationsfrom Becoming Kangaroo
Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 261 (2007) (noting the degree to which arbitration is, as a practical matter,
imposed by the contracting party with greater leverage); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum
Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 383, 432-34 (2008) (noting the degree to which
modem arbitration is often imposed en masse upon consumers or employees rather than being
agreed to as part of contract negotiations); accord, Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of
MandatoryArbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 18 (2003) (making a
similar point and referring to what this Article labels "new" or "mass" arbitration, in which
standardized contracts issued in high volume routinely provide for arbitration).
12. See infra Part Ill.B-C.
13. See infra Part III.D.
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ignored important issues of consent in contracting.14 At that time, the
Court's uncritical embrace of arbitration was only a dozen years old, a
pre-teen crush of sorts.
The Court's strongly pro-arbitration
jurisprudence, which began in 1983 or 1984-depending on which
arbitration critic you read,' 5 or perhaps even earlier' 6-is now in its late
twenties, a time when usually even the most romantic young person has
grown up emotionally or at least been stripped of adolescent naivety.
But the Court's relentless veneration of arbitration continues
unabated, as disturbingly reflected in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
InternationalCorp.,'7 Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson,'8 and AT&T
Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion.'9 In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court overturned an
arbitration panel's decision to permit class action treatment of a matter
based on the record of the dispute and the custom and practice of dispute
resolution in this industry. 20 In Rent-A-Center, the Court permitted the
drafter of the arbitration agreement to eject the judiciary from the process
of determining whether an arbitration agreement had in fact been madea decision at odds with the statutory language and the Court's prior
precedent forbidding the parties to agree to an expanded judicial role in
policing arbitration agreements and outcomes.2' In Concepcion, the
Court upheld an arbitration clause restricting class actions
notwithstanding California state contract law that deemed the term
unconscionable as an impermissible limitation on consumer remedies. 2 2
As discussed below, Concepcion is a particularly glaring display (by
a bare 5-4 majority vote) of the Court's infatuation with arbitration
overcoming what should have been its fidelity to the language,
legislative intent, and purpose of the Arbitration Act as well as
14. See Stempel, Bootstrappingand Slouching, supra note 11, at 1412.
15. Compare Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor CorporateTool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660 (1996) (describing new proarbitration jurisprudence of the Court as beginning with Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)), with Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 S. CT. REv. 331, 880 (describing the Court's pro-arbitration era as
beginning with Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)), and Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of UnconscionabilityAnalysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RES. 757, 776-79 (2004) (also
seeing Southland as the inauguration of the Court's strong pro-arbitration jurisprudence).
16. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing pre-Moses H. Cone cases).
17. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
18. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
19. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
20. See infra notes 355-74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen).
21. See infra notes 375-85 and accompanying text (discussing Rent-A-Center.).
22. See infra notes 386-423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion).
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inadequate appreciation of states' rights and the legal system's
commitment to making the class action remedy available in appropriate
cases.23 Concepcion, like Stolt-Nielsen, is also a reflection of the Court's
tainted love-an infatuation with arbitration when faced with issues of
contract law, party consent, statutory construction, or public policy but a
rejection of class action arbitration. Apparently, the Court's uncritical
view of arbitration shatters when confronted with its hostility to class
actions and its concern that powerful economic interests might lose some
of their advantage from the leveling effects of the class device.24
Rather than solely picking on Concepcion as a particularly egregious
example of the continued swoon of the Court (or at least five members of
the Court) regarding arbitration 25 or attacking many of the Court's
modem arbitration decisions on their outcomes alone, this discussion will
focus on the degree to which the Court's arbitration jurisprudence has
been disturbing not merely because it is often wrong (at least in the eyes
of many academic commentators and the dissenting Justices) but because
it also has so frequently been at odds with the professed jurisprudential
principles of the very Justices who have favored outcomes of enforced
arbitrability.
When the arbitration decisions of the past three decades are
examined under the majoritarian Justices' own widely accepted standards
of jurisprudence and statutory construction, the decisions frequently fail
the test of consistency and principle. In arbitration case after arbitration
case, a majority of the Court has jettisoned the profession's alleged
polestar jurisprudential principles in favor of compelling arbitrationunless it is the politically and economically stronger party that opposes
23. Id.
24. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunitiesfor Improvement
Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127,
1166 (2005) (noting the degree to which class treatment of issues tends to increase the leverage of
less powerful litigants and observing that institutional or repeat-player litigants such as governments,
businesses, or insurers tend to have this power in ordinary, non-class litigation); accord Bruce Hay
& David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1378-82 (2000) (noting the leveling effect of class
treatment). For discussion of the degree to which repeat-player litigants have advantages over "oneshot" litigants (e.g., consumers, employees, or debtors), see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (the
seminal article on this point); see also Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay,
Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & Soc'y REv. 803, 807-09 (1999) (finding
continued vitality in Professor Galanter's typology and observation); Stempel, supra, at 1166 n. 140.
25. See generally Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions:
Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 73
(2011).
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arbitration, producing result-oriented adjudication that ranks among the
worst examples in the Court's history.2 6
As a consequence, the Court has expanded the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act in ways that are inconsistent with the role of the judiciary
as fair and principled stewards of the rule of law. Instead of consistent
application of bedrock legal principles, the pro-arbitration Court
decisions of the modem era have often been just that-pro-arbitration
decisions fueled by infatuation with arbitration (or concerns about
maintaining the distinction between arbitration and litigation) sprinkled
with occasionally blatant preferences for the more powerful, rather than
the type of reflective assessment one expects from the bench.
In "going gaga" over arbitration, the Court has diminished itself in
the eyes of wide segments of the academy, the legal profession, and the
public. 2 7 As Justice Jackson famously observed, the Court is not
infallible but it is final.28 As a result, American law is for the moment
"stuck" with the Court's arbitration decisions. But they have been
controversial enough to fuel at least some non-trivial efforts at a
legislative response,2 9 something that could become reality should the
Democratic Party regain control of Congress. 30 Further, many of the
26. There is, of course, always ample room to debate which Supreme Court decisions are the
"worst." See, e.g., Symposium, Supreme Mistakes: Exploring the Most Maligned Decisions in
Supreme Court History, 39 PEPPER. L. REV. 1-223 (2011) (legal scholars examine infamously bad
Court decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)); Carol J. Williams, Scholars
Look at 'Supreme Mistakes', L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2011, at AA3 (discussing Pepperdine Symposium);
Symposium, The Worst Supreme Court Decision Ever?, 13 NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (legal
scholars identify less notorious Supreme Court decisions as among the "worst" because of poor
judicial craft, disingenuousness, or failure to appreciate the full context of the case).
27. Although there is substantial scholarship generally approving the Court's modem arbitration
jurisprudence, the bulk of commentary on the Court's arbitration decisions of the past forty years has
been quite critical. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 15, at 758-62 (gathering critical commentary); see
also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business; Employee and Consumer
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (criticizing the Supreme
Court's approval of pre-dispute arbitration clauses); Stemlight, supranote 15.
28. Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 540 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
29. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007, S. 1782, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies
and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration
Jurisprudence,48 HOUS. L. REv. 457, 491-93 (2011) (discussing legislative efforts including the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 and the role of recent Supreme Court decisions in motivating its
proponents); Stacy A. Hickox, Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REv. 101, 102-03 (2010) (discussing the role of recent
Supreme Court decisions in motivating legislative efforts like the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009).
30. See Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback: Supreme Court's Anti-Consumer Rulings Trigger
Democratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20l1 /
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arbitration precedents were either analytically infirm or the result of a
closely divided Court.3 ' They remain vulnerable to overruling depending
on the luck of incumbent longevity and whether retirements or deaths
32
take place during the term of a Republican or Democratic president.

10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisions-democratic-bills_n_1022207.html (predicting that reform
of the Arbitration Act will fail to pass in the current Congress because of Republican opposition).
Although an unfortunately large proportion of legal scholarship proceeds as if judicial decisions are
made in a political vacuum, there are clear ideological, political, and even partisan divisions over
mandated arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements, particularly "new" or "mass"
arbitration agreements. See Stempel, Mandating,supra note 11, at 398-99 (discussing the "CounterRevolutionary Voices" opposing the trend toward "mass" arbitration). The strongest support for
aggressive enforcement of the widespread standardized use of arbitration agreements has come from
the business community, its counsel, political conservatives, and allied political interests. See
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 78 (describing the Act as intended for the benefit of its business
community proponents). Conversely, the Court's enthusiasm for promoting mandatory arbitration
has been most resisted by consumer groups, employee groups, plaintiffs' counsel, and political
liberals. See generally Sterlight, supra note 15, at 701 (arguing that "unregulated mandatory
binding arbitration agreements can be detrimental to consumers, employees, and other little guys").
31. Several of the decisions treated by this article as most problematic were decided in 5-4
votes. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011); Rent-A-Ctr.
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1758 (2010).
32. Again, a little candor is in order notwithstanding the tendency of much legal scholarship to
act as though the Justices' prior political affiliations are irrelevant to their judicial decision-making.
In nearly all of the Court's reasonably "close" arbitration decisions of recent vintage-those decided
by 5-4 or 6-3 votes-the Justices supporting enforced arbitration, but resisting class-wide
arbitration, have been those appointed by Republican presidents while those resisting compelled
arbitration or supporting class-wide arbitration were those appointed by Democratic presidents.
For example, the current Court's pro-arbitration/anti-class action stalwarts are Chief Justice
John Roberts (appointed by Republican President George W. Bush) and Justices Samuel Alito
(appointed by George W. Bush), Clarence Thomas (appointed by Republican President George H.W.
Bush), Antonin Scalia (appointed by Republican President Ronald Reagan), and Anthony Kennedy
(appointed by Reagan). The Justices resistant to imposed mass arbitration are Elena Kagan
(appointed by Democratic President Barack Obama), Sonia Sotomayor (appointed by Obama),
Stephen Breyer (appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton), and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(appointed by Clinton).
Justice John Paul Stevens (appointed by Republican President Gerald R. Ford), who preceded
Justice Kagan as a member of the Roberts Court, was perhaps the only real exception to this pattern,
although one can make similar but weaker claims regarding Justice David Souter (appointed by
George H.W. Bush). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (appointed by Reagan), an important member of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, also was less predictable in her arbitration jurisprudence, most
prominently in opposing the Court's 1984 decision declaring that the Federal Arbitration Act
constituted substantive federal law rather than merely a rule of procedure applicable in federal
courts. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 169-214 and accompanying text (discussing Southland). To an extent, Justice Thomas
sometimes runs counter to this typology. For example, during his first decade on the Court, he took
the O'Connor position that Southland was wrongly decided. See infra notes 288, 314, 336, and 341
and accompanying text. But since the dawn of the Roberts Court in 2004, Justice Thomas has
almost always aligned with the pro-arbitration interests or the pro-powerful business forces. See
infra Part III.C-D (discussing arbitration cases of the late Rehnquist Court and the Roberts Court).
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Although many questions of law are sufficiently political to engender
opposition and thoughts of turning the tables in the future, the arbitration
precedents are a lightning rod for criticism as well as possible legislative
reform. These are particularly bad Court decisions in part because of
their outcomes (e.g., requiring employees to arbitrate, shunting disputes
to potentially unfair forums, or preventing class action treatment for the
very types of cases for which they were designed). The Court's
arbitration decisions are perhaps most condemnable because they reflect
Court majorities in which the prevailing Justices were so attracted to
arbitration (consciously or subconsciously)-or rather a particular type
of arbitration that was distinctly more constrained than litigation--on
grounds of personal preference that they acted in derogation of
mainstream legal analysis as well as their own asserted long-time
jurisprudence of adjudication and correct construction of positive law.
II. THE LEGAL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL ROAD AND THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE JUSTICES

The term "rule of law" has now been so overused as to become
something of a clich6. Both lawyers and laypersons increasingly seem to
see judging as an exercise in policy preferences, a perception fed by
recent battles over the disqualification practices of the Supreme Court as
Democrats and Republicans squared off in efforts to keep Justices Elena
Kagan and Clarence Thomas from participating in the review of the
constitutionality of the Obama administration's health care legislation
enacted in 2010.33
33. See Tony Mauro, Kagan, Thomas Appear Unlikely to Recuse in Health Care Reform Case,
246 N.Y. L.J. 6, Nov. 17, 2011, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticle
NY.jsp?id=1202532665408&slretum=1 (describing calls for Justice Kagan's recusal based on her
prior job as Solicitor General at the time when the Obama administration was considering legal
strategy in defending the Affordable Health Care Act of 2009 and for Justice Thomas's recusal
based on his wife's employment as a conservative activist opposing the law).
The conventional wisdom is that under prevailing rules neither Justice must recuse. See
Michael Mukasey, The ObamaCareRecusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2011, at Al 7 (former
federal trial judge and attorney general finding no merit to recusal arguments); Dahlia Lithwick,
Musing About Recusing, SLATE (Nov. 16, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news andpolitics/jurisprudence/2011/11/shouldelena kagan recuse herself fromthe obamacare
case-of course not .html (prominent liberal legal journalist expressing a similar view). And as a
practical matter, both Justices decided against recusing themselves from the case. How Health Care
Case Will Unfold Before the Court, NPR (Mar. 24, 2012, 7:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld=149277795.
But there was substantial support for the view that recusal would have been apt. See, e.g.,
Ronald D. Rotunda, Kagan Must Recuse from Obamacare Case, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at BI
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Despite increasingly obvious partisan invocation of the law, a
substantial portion of the bench and the legal profession in general,
continues to agree about basic aspects of jurisprudence. Even if judges
cannot always agree about the precise contours of "the law" by which we
will be ruled, they usually can agree on the rules of the legal process and,
in particular, approaches to construing statutes, assessing constitutional
concerns, adhering to stare decisis, and applying precedent.34 The legal
system embraces a reasonably concrete set of basic ground rules for
statutory construction. 3 5 The Supreme Court similarly embraces-or at
least claims to embrace-these mainstream judicial approaches.36
(noted conservative law professor finding grounds for Kagan recusal); Deborah Rhode, Ethical
Oversight for the Justices, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 14, 2011, available at http://Ilaw.com/jsp/
nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202485716021 (noted liberal law professor finding Justice Thomas's
situation troubling and noting other instances of excessive coziness between conservative Justices
and powerful business or government figures with matters before the Court, most infamously Justice
Scalia's duck hunting trip with former Vice President Dick Cheney, then a defendant in a case
challenging his energy task force's confidential meetings with industry lobbyists).
The situation raised enough discomfort to spawn two lawsuits directed toward developing
evidence in support of recusal-one by a liberal group, one by a conservative group-and proposed
legislation broadening the grounds for disqualification of the Justices. See Supreme Court
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (proposing application
of the Code of Conduct to Supreme Court Justices); Media Research Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Nos. 10-2013 (ESH), 11-0426 (ESH), 2011 WL 4852224, at *13 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (granting
summary judgment on a motion by the Justice Department in a consolidated action under Freedom
of Information Act).
34. See, e.g., EVA H. HANKS, MICHAEL E. HERZ & STEVEN S. NEMERSON, ELEMENTS OF LAW

163-206, 253-296, 329-340 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing stare decisis and precedent, as well as
theories and sources of statutory interpretation and canons of construction, noting that at least "a
moderately strong consensus ... holds among most contemporary judges" regarding theories of
statutory interpretation); see also MICHAEL A. BERCH, REBECCA WHITE BERCH & RALPH S.
SPRITZER, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 34-35, 40-

52, 57-69, 379-86, 436-46, 476-77 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the concept of stare decisis and role of
precedent in judicial decisions, with a focus on jurists' views of the judicial process and function,
with additional discussion of the interpretation of statutes and constitutional limitations on the power
of federal courts to hear cases). See generally CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND
WRITING 53-67 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the role of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis in
the court system).
35. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY chs. 7-8 (4th ed. 2007) (describing mainstream

approaches to statutory construction based on a law's text, legislative background, purpose, and
function); see also id. at 847-1100 (discussing widely accepted rules, presumptions, and canons of
statutory construction as well as accepted extrinsic sources for statutory interpretation, including
legislative background).
36. See, e.g., Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (stating that the
interpretation of a word or phrase in a statute "depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that
inform the analysis"); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005) (holding that the text of a
statute resolved a dispute over interpretation, remarking that the Court "must presume that [the]
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there" (citation omitted)
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Justices in the majority in most of the arbitration cases over the past
thirty years are particularly likely to style themselves as mainstream and
resist allegations of judicial activism, 37 although their application of
mainstream jurisprudence often has a conservative slant.38
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499
U.S. 117, 128 (1991) ("As always, we begin with the language of the statute and ask whether
Congress has spoken on the subject before us. 'If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court . .. must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)));
see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-37
(1997) (expressing support for strict textual reading of law, following established doctrine, and
deferring to original understanding of laws); Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview: A PracticingJudge 's
Perspective, 78 TEX. L. REV. 761, 766 (2000) (expressing a less text-centered view that gives more
weight to legislative background and functional operation of statutes but a view not widely disparate
from that of the considerably more conservative Justice Scalia); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
LegislativeHistory in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (arguing for the use
of legislative history when the statute's text is ambiguous); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1184-85 (1989) (expressing support for strict textual reading,
following established doctrine, and deferring to original understanding of laws). See generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008) (expressing a legal realist view of the judicial
process that includes a chapter entitled "The Supreme Court Is a Political Court" but nonetheless
also observing the widespread judicial embrace of mainstream legal principles and the strong
tendency of jurists to wish to be perceived as fair-minded, mainstream, and not excessively political,
partisan, or result-oriented).
37. See generally TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 358-61, 380-432 (2001) (discussing the backgrounds and the professional and public
view of the mainstream judicial approaches of Justices William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R.
White, Thurgood Marshall, Warren E. Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist,
John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter,
Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, all Justices participating in the Court's
modern arbitration decisions during the period from 1980 to the present); DAVID G. SAVAGE, II
GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1049-61, 1160-66 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing Court
membership and fitting Justices into legal establishment even if they are otherwise demographically
diverse and providing brief biographies of Justices involved in Court's modem arbitration decisions
from Justice William Brennan to Justice Sonia Sotomayor).
This Article is not naively suggesting that there are no significant jurisprudential differences
between the Justices. On the contrary, some are distinctly more liberal or more conservative, more
formalist or functionalist, more textual or more contextual than others. See generally HENRY J.
ABRAHAM,

JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS,

AND SENATORS:

A HISTORY OF U.S.

SUPREME COURT

APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th ed. 2008) (providing a particularly candid and
realistic history of the degree to which ideological, jurisprudential, political, and even partisan
factors played a role in the appointment and confirmation process). But notwithstanding the very
real differences between the Justices, a review of their backgrounds demonstrates that all qualify as
"mainstream" judicial actors that purport to agree on basic premises of the legal process and do not
espouse "impermissible" views that would have threatened or precluded nomination and
confirmation.
38. In particular Justices such as Warren Burger, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy,
David Souter, John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito are generally
characterized as judicial conservatives, particularly the latter four. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at
233-324 (discussing the judicial conservatism of these Justices as it related to their appointment);
HALL, supra note 37, at 384-87, 404-23 (describing the political leanings of Justices Burger,
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This judicial center of gravity seems particularly well established in
Although the Court's major
matters of statutory interpretation.
arbitration cases present a range of legal questions, all are statutory
construction cases focusing on the proper application of the Federal
Arbitration Act-sometimes alone, sometimes in combination or
arguable conflict with other statutes. Regarding statutory construction,
the Supreme Court, during the same period that it has longingly
embraced arbitration, has also professed fidelity to a statutory
construction regime emphasizing the following interpretative tools.
A. Statutory Text
Mainstream legal thought places substantial emphasis on statutory
text, and the Court has repeatedly used a statute's text as the starting
point for assessing a statute such as the Arbitration Act.39 Justice
Antonin Scalia is famous for his heavily textualist brand of statutory
construction that looks almost exclusively at the text of the statute and
eschews examination of the legislative history of the law or its overall
purpose. 40 But even relative non-textualists such as Justice Stephen
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas); THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 107-96 (2004)
(describing the rise of the conservative wing of the Court starting with the end of the Warren era).
See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 311-36, 362-77 (1993)
(describing the historical development of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts); THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 463-64, 492, 504-05, 514, 512-13, 521-22
(Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005). But none of these Justices are described as so conservative as to
fall outside the judicial mainstream or be accused of espousing views inconsistent with the basic
legal canon. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9 (suggesting that in practice and application, the
current conservative Justices are rendering decisions inconsistent with the Constitution).
39. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 765-66 (noting that Judge Frank Easterbrook insists
that courts have no authority even to apply a statute to a problem unless the statute's language
clearly targets that problem); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001)
(relying on the "plain meaning" of the Federal Arbitration Act's clause that excludes from coverage
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce," and holding that the Act exempts only contracts of employment of
transportation workers, not all employment contracts (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2008))); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (following the "plain language of the
FAA" in holding that the Act's exclusionary clause did not apply to the employee's arbitration
agreement, which was contained in a securities registration application and not an employment
contract).
40. See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 35, at 765 (noting that Justice Scalia delivered a series of
speeches urging courts to abandon virtually any reference to legislative history); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (describing Scalia's refusal to
look at legislative history); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise andFall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 32-33 (2006) (noting one finds more textual rhetoric in the opinions of Justices Scalia and
Thomas); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
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Breyer, a comparative fan of legislative history and deferring to agency
constructions of a statute, 41 agree that the text of the law is the most
important consideration and the place where statutory construction must
begin.4 2 Chief Justice Roberts-and Chief Justices Rehnquist and
Burger before him-and the other Justices of the current Court all agree
on the importance of text, with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
appearing closer to Justice Scalia's more textual orientation. Other
Justices serving during the modem pro-arbitration era of the Court,
including Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter, also
reflected the legal profession's general preference for the primacy of text
in statutory construction, even if the primacy is at times a "soft" one.
Overall, the Court as a whole has historically tended to operate in a
pragmatic, largely centrist manner without undue emphasis on any
particular method of statutory interpretation.43
B. Legislative Intent
All members of the Court during the modem pro-arbitration era,
except Justice Scalia, acknowledge that the drafting history and
legislative intent of a statute are relevant to determining its meaning and
CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1598 (1991) (noting that Justice Scalia has urged the abandonment of the
Court's traditional use of legislative history); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION, POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS ch. 5 (5th ed. 2009) (providing a

general overview of problems with the overly textualist view and noting leavening doctrines such as
the whole act rule and the canon against overly literal constructions that leads to an absurd result).
41. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses ofLegislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845 (1992) (defending the legitimacy of legislative intent as an interpretative tool); see also
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 955-56, 971-73, 990 nj (noting acceptance of legislative
background and other extrinsic information as tools of statutory construction and collecting
substantial academic commentary to support both Justice Breyer's and Justice Scalia's view of the
role of legislative history).
42. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §645.16 (West 1947) (codifying the view that legislative intent
"controls" judicial construction of statutory meaning) ("The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature."); United States v.
Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011) (stating that "[w]e begin with the text of the statute" in a case involving
interpretation of a Fair Labor Standards Act provision); POPKIN, supra note 40, at chs. 2-5 (noting
that for most of legal history legislative intent or purpose was seen as the touchstone of statutory
construction and even more salient than statutory text but that text has attained more prominence in
modem statutory construction theory).
43. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 57 (1994) (observing that the Court is unlikely to adhere to any single foundation
for interpreting statutes); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 322 (1990) (suggesting that the Court considers a broad
range of textual, historical, and evolutive evidence when it interprets statutes) [hereinafter Eskridge
& Frickey, Statutory Interpretation].
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application in particular contexts. 44 The Justices vary in the degree to
which they will end their inquiry if the text appears to direct a result.4 5
Some appear to see legislative history as inappropriate unless the
statutory text is ambiguous, while others appear willing to consult
legislative history as a check on their reading of the text. A few, on
occasion, even suggest that sufficiently clear legislative intent may be
invoked to determine if seemingly clear statutory language is a drafting
error. 46 The Justices also frequently differ, of course, as to whether
particular language is ambiguous.4 7

44. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 146-161 (2000)
(utilizing legislative in the majority opinion by Justice O'Connor, which Justices Scalia and Thomas
joined); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 (1989) (invoking legislative history in Justice
White's majority opinion); Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855-61, 862-69 (1984) (using
legislative history in Justice Marshall's); id at 862--69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (taking a textualist
approach); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-602 (1983) (considering legislative
history in Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S.
668, 669-70 (1979) (relying heavily on legislative background and perceived intent and purpose of
Congress in Justice Rehnquist's opinion); see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal
Justices' Reliance on Legislative History: Principle,Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 169-70 (2008) (finding that both liberal and conservative Justices make
frequent resort to legislative history); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (noting widespread
acceptance of legislative history as an interpretative tool but contending that the Court has not been
following "consistent and uniform rules for statutory construction and use of legislative materials").
But see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 987-90 (noting Justice Scalia's opposition to the use of
legislative history, specifically committee reports).
45. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 507, 527, 530 (1989) (providing
three different approaches to the use of legislative history in the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions).
46. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INAMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 10-11 (2002) (describing various "interpretive agendas" of Supreme Court
Justices); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1916
(2006) (describing the contrasting views of "purposivists" and "textualists" toward legislative
history); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court's First Era: An
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 241-42, 50-58 (2011) (describing the
Roberts Court's perspectives on, and use of, interpretive tools, such as legislative history and
legislative intent).
47. Compare Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659-68 (2011) (concluding that no statute
expressly and unequivocally includes a waiver of sovereign immunity to private suits for money
damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)), with id. at
1664-68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating the majority's conclusion cannot be reconciled with the
fact that the availability of such relief is evident in light of RLUIPA's plain terms). Other examples
exist. Compare Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (concluding the Immigration and
Nationality Act has an ambiguity), with id. at 550 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting a statute cannot be
deemed ambiguous until the court exhausts the traditional tools of statutory construction).
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C. Legislative Purpose
Legislative intent connotes a specific intent of the legislature to
achieve a particular result or that courts apply statutory language in a
specific way in situations envisioned by the drafters. 48 Legislative
purpose connotes more general goals of the statute. 4 9 For example,
where the legislative history reflects congressional consensus that
particular legal precedents be overturned, this is a matter of legislative
intent. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act,50 for example, was designed
specifically to overrule the Court's 1976 GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert
decision by deeming pregnancy discrimination a violation of Title VII, a
reversal of the Court's finding that pregnancy discrimination by an
employer did not violate Title VII because only women get pregnant.
Where, by contrast, the legislative history reflects a more general
congressional desire to achieve certain results, or to prevent or
discourage undesirable results, this is a matter of legislative purpose. For
example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199552
(PSLRA) was designed to make it more difficult to bring securities
violation lawsuits on the basis of a hunch and, therefore, required more
particularized pleading. The statute did not, however, clearly state
whether the specified pleading standards found in case law applying
Based on the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) were adequate.
legislative purpose of the law and its enactment, notwithstanding the
existence of Rule 9(b), a judge might view the legislative purpose as
requiring more particularized pleading than found under the Rule in
cases subject to the PSLRA.5 4 Conversely, a judge might find
48. See POPKIN, supra note 40, at 251-56 (noting the distinction between legislative intent as
something specifically sought by an enacting legislature and legislative purpose as the more
generalized goals of legislation).
49. Id.
50. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
51. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134, 145-46 (1976), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; see also AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct.
1962, 1967, 701 (2009) (noting that current statutory provision superseded Gilbert).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2006) (codification of pleading standards of Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995).
53. See Marc I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Comejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading
Doctrines: The Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges with the
Heightened FraudPleading Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REv. LITIG. 1, 16-25
(2010).
54. See, e.g., Hill v. Gozani, 638 F.3d 40, 55 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the PSLRA goes
further than Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) with regard to the scienter element and requires that the pleading
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
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congressional silence on the issue an indication that Congress, despite its
general concern over weak securities claims filed on a hunch, simply
wanted something more than mere notice pleading and wider application
of cases taking a strong view of Rule 9(b).ss
Another example is provided by the Sherman5 6 and Clayton 7
Antitrust Acts, which were both designed to fight monopolization and to
forbid contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of tradebut Congress was relatively vague about how that should be done.
Although there is some legislative history suggesting that the laws were
designed to prevent specific behemoths such as the Sugar Trust or the
domination of the oil industry by John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil
Company, the statutes are, in the main, laws expressing general
purposive guidelines.58 As a result, the courts have tended to apply
"rules of reason" rather than per se rules in many cases challenging
alleged anti-competitive conduct. 59 Judge Posner has characterized the
required state of mind" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A))); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372
F.3d 137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating "to the extent that Rule 9(b)'s allowance of general pleading
with respect to mental state conflicts with the PSLRA's requirement that plaintiffs 'state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind,' the PSLRA supersedes Rule 9(b) as it relates to Rule 10b-5 actions" (citation omitted)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A))).
55. Justice Stevens was perhaps the best known proponent of what is sometimes called the "dog
didn't bark" approach to statutory construction. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 389
("Congress would not have authorized vote dilution claims in judicial elections without making an
express, unambiguous statement to that effect."). Under this view, congressional silence can be
regarded as meaningful and frequently is invoked to suggest that a newly enacted statute was not
designed to overturn an established practice touching on the area of statutory concern. If Congress
wanted to make a change, then it logically would have indicated as much the face of the statute or in
the legislative history. That Congress did not speak implies it intended no such change. See
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 1035.

The metaphor is taken from the Sherlock Holmes story involving the theft of a prize racehorse
at night from a stable in which the family dog did not bark during the burglary. Chisom, 501 U.S. at
396 n.23. Holmes correctly discerns that the thief must have been "someone whom the dog knew
well," such that the animal was not alarmed enough to bark. Id.; see also ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE,
Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 415 (Barnes & Noble Classics ed., 2003).
56. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
57. See id §§ 12-27.
58. See Robert H. Bork, LegislativeIntent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7,
10-11 (1966).
59. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND

ITS PRACTICE § 6.4 (4th ed. 2011) ("In antitrust litigation most practices are considered to be
analyzed under a rule of reason. A per se rule is generally appropriate only after judges have had
long experience with a certain practice, and have concluded that the practice produces many
pernicious results and almost no beneficial ones."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39-40
(2d ed. 2001) (distinguishing "Rule of Reason" from per se rules in the antitrust context); I JULIAN
0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.01(2) (b) (2d ed. 1999)
("Consequently, the common law courts sustained particular restrictions provided that they were
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Sherman Act as something of a common law statute, one that seems to
invite judicial application because of the absence of specific directives in
the law's text or legislative history.o
In construing the antitrust laws, the Court has used legislative
purpose to trump the actual text of the law. For example, if the Sherman
Act were read literally and applied to "every" contract restraining trade,
franchises and licenses would be forbidden, because this is both the
literal language of the statute and because all contracts by definition
constrain the contracting parties to at least some degree, in that, as a
result of the contract, they are obligated to perform or pay damages.62
This view can also be considered akin to the "absurd result" canon of
statutory construction, a principle positing that statutory text will not be
applied so literally as to render an absurd result. 63

both reasonableand ancillary to the main transaction. Of particular importance is the fact that the
'rule of reason,' a method by which the legality of restraints are analyzed, is derived directly from
these exceptions for reasonable and ancillary restraints."); see also 15 U.S.C. §9.02(3)(b) ("A close
examination of the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act reveals that the Act does not make
specific methods of business conduct or particular types of business arrangement unlawful.
Congress chose, instead, to adopt a statute that, by the very generality of its language, would
interdict any contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrained trade as well as monopolies.
Because the Sherman Act is couched in such broad terms, the courts have been able to adapt it to the
changing methods of commercial production and distribution since its enactment.").
60. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism,Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 212 (1986) ("The Sherman Act is a standard
instance of a statute that is poorly thought through, that is delivered to the courts in a severely
incomplete state, that begs-though it doesn't actually ask-the courts to do what they can to make
it reasonable."); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) ("Sometimes a statute will state whether it is to be
broadly or narrowly construed; more often the structure and language of the statute will supply a
clue. If the legislature enacts into statute law a common law concept, as Congress did when it
forbade agreements in 'restraint of trade' in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to
interpret the statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law
principle. . . ."); accord HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, §2.1b ("Federal courts have always
interpreted the antitrust statutes in a common law fashion, and the result is a substantial divergence
between statutory language and judicial decision.").
61. The Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade" is illegal. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).
62. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAURENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING

DEALS: CONTRACTS INCONTEXT 1-3 (2d ed. 2006) (observing that contract law exists to satisfy the
basic impulse that the reasonable expectations excited by a promise are entitled to recompense in a
court of law).
63. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (applying the absurd result exception
to the general rule of applying the "plain" textual meaning of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (noting that a "literal reading would compel an odd result in a
case like this").
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D. The Hierarchy ofLegislative History
Not all legislative history is created equal, but jurists tend to agree on
the relative authority and persuasiveness of different forms of legislative
history. In general, there is a preference, in roughly the following order
for: committee reports," statements by the chief authors of the
legislation, hearing testimony and congressional reaction, floor
statements, and contemporary accounts of enactment of the legislation.
E. Canons of Construction
Canons of statutory construction are general rules for interpreting the
laws and are derived from common understandings of drafting
conventions, legislative processes, public policy, or jurisprudence.
Although varying in their affection for particular canons, all of the
Justices appear to find them potentially useful in particular situations.
Among the more commonly invoked canons are those of textual
construction such as:67
* the plain meaning rule, which requires adherence to the clear
linguistic meaning of statutory text unless this would bring about
an absurd result or there is evidence that the text is in error in
departing from the specific intent of the legislature; 68

64. See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative
Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (over a forty-year period, more
than forty-five percent of the Court's citations to legislative history were to committee reports); see,
e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, n.7 (1984) (relying on a Senate report regarding a
civil rights bill that was not enacted but that included similarities to the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
65. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 981, 1029 (observing that compared to committee
reports, statements made during committee hearings and floor debates have traditionally received
less weight); POPKIN, supra note 40, at 6, 9-11; see also OTTO J. HETZEL ET AL., LEGISLATIVE LAW
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 589-90 (3d ed. 2001) (providing an

extensive list of twenty different forms of legislative background information that courts may use).
66. See generally, HETZEL ET AL., supra note 65, at 705-65 (discussing judicially created
canons).
67. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B (presenting an exhaustive review of the
canons).
68. See id; see, e.g., Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26-29 (2003) (noting that "when a
statute is 'silent or ambiguous' we must defer to a reasonable construction").
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* expressio unius exclusio alterius, meaning the expression of
one thing suggests the exclusion of things not included in the list
or catalog;69
* noscitur a sociis, which requires a general term to be
construed in a manner consistent with similar specific terms in a
statute; 70
* ejusdem generis, providing that general terms should be
construed to reflect the class of objects shown in exemplary or
specific terms used in the statute;7'
* preference for ordinary meaning rather than technical or
specialist meaning (unless there is strong legislative history
indicating congressional preference for the specialized
meaning);72
* continued use of the settled meaning of terms previously
defined in adjudication;7 3
* use of dictionary definitions (unless there is evidence to
suggest this definition was not intended by Congress); 74
* deference to experts, such as administrative
regarding the meaning of a term; 75 and

agencies,

69. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 19.
70. See id. app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (noting
that "[t]he constructional problem is resolved by the ... principle ... that a word is known by the
company it keeps").
71. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 106 (2001) (applying ejusdem generis to the terms "seamen" and "railroad
employees"); see also infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text (discussing Circuit City).
72. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (citing the preference for ordinary meaning as an "ordinary rule of
statutory construction").
73. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.,
543 U.S. 481, 487 (2005) (presuming that Congress intended the word "seaman" to have the same
meaning as under established maritime law).
74. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see, e.g., Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben,
488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988) (citing the Webster's Dictionary definition of"criteria").
75. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 20; see e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v.
Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) (stating that the Court will uphold an administrative agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute).

HeinOnline -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 813 2011-2012

814

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

* in the absence of information to establish a definition, resort
to the default definitions of terms set forth in the Rules of
Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, if available.76
In addition, there are a number of grammar, punctuation, and syntax
canons. These include the "rule of the last antecedent"77 and the
understanding that "may" implies discretion,'78 "shall" implies something
mandatory or less discretionary,79 and "or" is disjunctive rather than
conjunctive. 0
Additionally, there are widely accepted canons regarding what might
Among
be termed the structural or "textual integrity of the statute.
these are:
* the whole act rule, which provides that particular terms or
provisions of a statute must be construed with reference to the
entire statute and the commands and goals of the legislation; 82
* the presumption of purposive amendment, which is the view
that amendments to a statute, unless specifically denominated as
"housekeeping" amendments, are designed to have a significant
substantive impact on the statute and its meaning;83
* a preference for the avoidance of broad constructions of the
statute unless justified by the statutory language or indications
that Congress intended the statute to have broad construction; 84
76. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Stewart, 543 U.S. at 488
(noting that the Rules of Construction Act provides the default definition of "vessel").
77. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank,
508 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1993) (articulating the rule of the last antecedent).
78. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Jama v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005) (providing that "may" implies discretion).
79. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 21; see, e.g., Mallard v. United States Dist.
Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (stating that "shall" implies a command).
80. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 35, app. B, at 21.
81. See id
82. See id.; see, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630 (2007)
(declining plaintiffs argument because it would be inconsistent with Title VII as a whole),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Grp., 493 U.S.
120, 123 (1989) (holding a specific phrase of Rule 11 should be viewed in context of the rule as a
whole), superseded by rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (amended 1993).
83. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000).
84. Id. at 159-60 (narrowly construing Congressional grants of authority to the FDA). This
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* the view that specific terms of a statute designed to deal with
a particular issue are generally given greater weight than more
general provisions of the statute;8 5 and
* a view that exceptions to the reach of the statute expressed by
the legislature should be strictly construed in order to prevent
evisceration of the statute through expansive application of
exceptions. 86
There is also judicial agreement tending to embrace canons
expressing a preference for "continuity in law."
Among these is a
presumption of stare decisis, but acceptance that wrongly decided
precedents can be overruled where the case for change is sufficiently
compelling. 8 In addition, there is a presumption against repeals by
implication and a presumption that statutory terms are used consistently
across statutes. 90 Related to these presumptions is the in pari materia
rule providing that the use of similar statutory provisions in comparable
statutes will be applied in the same way. 9 1 There is also a canon that the
views of a later Congress are generally not seen as illuminating the views
of an enacting Congress.9 2

canon sometimes comes into tension with the canon that remedial legislation is to be liberally
construed to implement its purpose.
85. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-26 (1989) ("A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is
no more specific rule.").
86. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 23; see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499
U.S. 160, 167 (1991) ("Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied ... [absent] contrary legislative intent."
(quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980))).
87. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 25-26.

88. Id.
89. See id app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-50 (1974) (calling the
"presumption against repeals by implication" a "cardinal rule").
90. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 567-68 (1988) (discussing the interpretation of the meaning of "substantially justified" across
statutes).
91. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 26; see, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640-43 (2007) (analyzing arguments based on analogies to the EPA and
FLSA in an EEOC claim), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). As observed above,
Ledbetter was legislatively overruled in 2009 because of a widespread perception that the Court's
holding was in error; the in pari materia canon, however, is widely followed by both liberals and
conservatives, although they may of course differ in its application. See sources cited supra note 82.
92. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 28.
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In addition, there are also a number of canons reflecting substantive
policy generally embraced by the courts. Despite the legal realist truth
that judges can differ considerably in their personal preferences, the
bench as a group appears to accept a basic core of substantive legal,
political, and social substantive values as well as adherence to governing
procedural rules. For example, a leading casebook divides these canons
into several groups, including:
* federalism canons, which indicate (1) a strong presumption
against statutory construction that would alter the federal-state
balance of power, including a "super strong" rule against federal
invasion of core state functions,93 and (2) a presumption against
federal preemption of traditional state regulation, although this
presumption can be overcome by clear statutory language or
evidence of clear congressional purpose, so long as Congress has
authority to so act pursuant to the Supremacy Clause; 94 and
* due process canons and canons derived from common law,
which include (1) a presumption against construing statutes in a
manner that works to deny a jury trial otherwise available under
the Constitution, 95 (2) a presumption in favor of judicial
review, 9 6 and (3) a presumption in favor of enforcing forumselection clauses.97
As discussed below, the bulk of these canons or other conventions of
statutory construction weigh against most pre-arbitration jurisprudence
of the modern Court. The Court's support of arbitration is now so
sufficiently established that legal scholars have posited that we now also
have canons of construction favoring arbitration.98 This disturbing
93. See id. app. B, at 30.
94. See id., app. B, at 31; see, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359
(2002) (holding that an Illinois statute did not conflict with ERISA's civil enforcement scheme);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992) (holding that the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt state law damages actions).
95. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 35, app. B, at 33.
96. See id.
97. See id.; e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (enforcing a forumselection clause because it was not fundamentally unfair); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that forum-selection clauses are enforceable and
further vital interests of the justice system).
98. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, app. B, at 38 (noting that there is "[fJederal court
deference to arbitral awards, even where the Federal Arbitration Act is not by its terms applicable"
and stating that there exists a "[s]trong presumption in favor of arbitration" and a "[riule favoring
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development reflects the degree to which the Court's excessive affection
for a particular concept has interfered with fair application of traditional
tools of adjudication.
The legal profession should be hesitant to accept the premise that we
have entered an era where there legitimately exists a "pro-arbitration"
canon or set of canons. Although there appear to be broad social
concerns about excessive litigation and a preference for less formal and
combative modes of dispute resolution,99 it is not at all clear that the
public and the body politic reflexively favor mandatory, privatized mass
arbitration over litigation, mediation, or some government-administered
hybrid such as court-annexed arbitration or an ombudsperson.o00 To the
contrary, employees, consumers, debtors, and state governments-large
segments of society-appear to have significant objections to being
"forced" to arbitrate due to judicial enforcement of broadly worded,
standardized arbitration clauses embedded in contracts of adhesion.10
arbitration of federal statutory claims").
99. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at
Twenty: FaitAccompli, Failed Overture,or Fledgling Adulthood?, II OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
297, 309-24 (1996) (reviewing the history of the modem ADR movement, which included both
community efforts and rise of popularity of arbitration and mediation in business contexts). A major
spur supporting ADR was the "Pound Conference" organized by Chief Justice Burger, which
included prominent speakers criticizing excessive litigation and extolling the benefits of ADR. See
id. at 316; see also Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-27 (1982)
(reflecting the former Chief Justice's strong support for arbitration and other forms of ADR and use
of the bully pulpit of Chief Justiceship to promote both private and court-annexed arbitration).
100. See Stempel, Mandating, supra note 11, at 385-86 (2008) (noting the substantial
differences between the traditional style of arbitration envisioned by the Congress that enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act and the modem mass arbitration sought by vendors, lenders, and employers
on the basis of broadly worded standardized clauses contained in contracts of adhesion deployed in
high volume under circumstances where non-drafters have little or no appreciation of the existence
of the arbitration agreement or its meaning); see also generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average
Consumer's Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 62, 73 (outlining a
study showing that nearly all consumer contracts of some type (e.g., cell phone contracts) have
arbitration clauses but that consumers are largely ignorant of them).
101. See, e.g., Arbitrators, Civil Rights Groups Tell U.S. Supreme Court: Don't ErodeAccess to
Courts, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?
ID=3105 (describing "broad coalition of civil rights groups, labor unions and consumer advocacy
organizations" that filed amici briefs opposing mandatory arbitration in Rent-A-Center); Mandatory
Arbitration, PUBLIC JUSTICE, http://www.publicjustice.net/Key-Issues-Cases/Access-To-Justice/
Mandatory-Arbitration.aspx (last visited Feb. I1, 2012) (describing the group's "Mandatory
Arbitration Abuse Prevention Project"); Fair Arbitration, PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/
Page.aspx?pid=2512 (last visited Feb. I1, 2012) (providing resources on taking action against forced
arbitration and arbitration fairness); All Things Considered: Rape Case Highlights Arbitration
Debate (NPR radio broadcast June 9, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=105153315 (describing former Halliburton employee's efforts to combat
mandatory arbitration clauses).
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One state attorney general brought charges that resulted in a large
arbitration provider abandoning the field of debtor arbitration. 10 2 There
has also, of course, been substantial scholarly criticism of the
enforcement of such clauses. 103
These factors suggest that there is not a strong national consensus in
favor of arbitration, regardless of the contextual factors of a given case
The pro-arbitration rejoinder to this
and arbitration agreement.
observation, of course, is that there is a federal statute favoring
arbitration that has been the law of the land since 1926, which is not bad
support for a pro-arbitration canon of construction. But this still begs the
question of whether the Arbitration Act, which was designed to foster
specific enforcement of arbitration clauses in traditional commercial
contracts among merchants, was ever meant to apply to the new mass
arbitration and whether the now eighty-six-year-old act can be
legitimately expanded by the judiciary to the point of fairly supporting
the existence of a pro-arbitration canon.
Under the traditional approach to statutory construction, as discussed
below in reviewing the Court's thirty-year embrace of arbitration, the
answer would appear to be a clear "no." The intent and purpose of the
Act was rather narrowly focused upon merchants rather than consumers,
employees, or debtors and specifically exempted employees, although
the courts aggressively confined the scope of this exception, even prior to
the modern Supreme Court amore for arbitration.10 4 Much of the pro102. See In re Nat'l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 832, 835 (2010)
("On July 14, 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General brought a complaint in Hennepin County
against NAF alleging consumer fraud act and deceptive trade practices act violations and false
advertising. NAF settled that litigation less than a week later, agreeing to cease performing
consumer arbitrations and entering into a consent judgment to that effect with the Minnesota
Attorney General."); Kathy Chu & Taylor McGraw, Minnesota Lawsuit Claims Credit Card
ArbitrationFirm Has Ties to Industry, U.S.A. TODAY, July 15, 2009, at 6A; Carrick Mollenkamp, et
al., Turmoil in ArbitrationEmpire Upends Credit-CardDisputes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A14
("NAF settled the case with Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson in July without admitting the
charges. It agreed in the settlement to stop arbitrating credit-card cases nationwide."); see also Tom
Abate, Arbitration Firm Calling It Quits, S.F. CHRON., July 22, 2009, at Cl (describing similar
lawsuit by the San Francisco city attorney's office against the NAF); Sam Zuckerman, S.F. Sues
Credit CardService, Alleging Bias, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 2008, at DI (same).
103. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 373-79
(2002); Kenneth R. Davis, The Arbitration Claws: Unconscionabilityin the Securities Industry, 78
B. U. L. REV. 255 (1998) ; Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process Is Due?, 39
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002); Schwartz, supra note 27; Stemlight, supra note 15; Jean R.
Sternlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
104. See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

9-11 (3d ed. 2011) (describing the background of the Act and other arbitration legislation such as
the Uniform Arbitration Act and Labor Management Relations Act, which covers labor arbitration);
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arbitration jurisprudence of the last thirty years has emerged because the
Court failed to faithfully apply more long-standing canons and principles
of statutory construction. Particularly disappointing is the Court's
unwillingness to follow statutory text or legislative history when it
argues against arbitration and the Court's failure to appreciate the
federalism implications of Court decisions riding roughshod over the
states' traditional powers of contract construction and policing of
allegedly unfair contracts. 105
Under these circumstances, it would be a mistake via illegitimate fait
accompli to attempt to defend the current Court's arbitration decisions as
justified according to a perceived pro-arbitration canon of construction.
It is also a bit of a tautology for a court to construe a statute concerning
arbitration through the lens of a pro-arbitration canon. The very object
of the exercise of judicial scrutiny is to assess the meaning of the
arbitration statute. Resort to a mythical pro-arbitration canon prejudges
the issue and short circuits the judicial process.
Although there has not been a great amount of systematic empirical
analysis of the individual Justices' use of the canons, it appears that the
more politically and jurisprudentially conservative Justices make more
frequent use of the canons, perhaps as an alternative to greater resort to
legislative history or more open-ended public policy analyses. 10 6 For
example, Justice Scalia has made use of the canons, presumably because
this permits him to better construe statutory language without resort to
legislative history. 0 7
LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 554-63 (4th ed. 2009) (describing

the background of the Arbitration Act); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of
Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 277-83 (1990) (describing the Act's "genesis,
thrust and context").
105. See infra notes 355-74 and accompanying text (discussing Stolt-Nielsen); infra notes 386423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion).
106. See James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1, 52-53, 57-63 (2005) (noting the degree to which
conservative Justices invoke canons of construction more frequently than liberal Justices and that the
Rehnquist Court utilized canons more frequently than the less conservative Burger Court); see also
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 35, at 951 (referencing Circuit City as an example of result-oriented
invocation of canons by conservative majority and noting that "[a] neutral observer who just read the
statute and the legislative history in Circuit City, for example, would have expected the Court to read
the labor exemption to the Arbitration Act much more expansively than the five-Justice majority in
fact did").
107. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(calling for application of the canon requiring doubts to be resolved in favor of the defendant where
there is ambiguity in a criminal statute); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.,
515 U.S. 687, 720-21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying the canon noscitur a sociis); Chisom
v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the "regular method" for
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F. More ControversialApproaches to Statutory Construction
As noted above, the mainstream approach to statutory construction
embraced by the Justices generally begins with and emphasizes text but
also considers legislative intent and purpose to the degree appropriate so
long as it does not strain the reading of the text. The Court as a whole
seems to have been less willing, or perhaps even unwilling, to endorse
some of the less-established modes of statutory interpretation, which
Among these are
enjoy support in the academic community.
group influence
of
interest
considerations of public policy, appreciation
on legislation, and the view that construction of legislation should evolve
with changing circumstances. os In practice, however, it appears that
courts use a variety of approaches that permit them to exercise more
personal preferences than courts are willing to acknowledge.o 9 In
addition, there are questions of the role of the executive branch and
administrative agencies in the construction of statutes.110
Against this backdrop of the generally-agreed-upon ground rules of
statutory construction, the Court's jurisprudence-even when it was less
enamored of arbitration-is not a particularly fine example of judicial
craft. Under "normal" circumstances where the Justices consistently
applied the agreed rules of statutory interpretation, one would expect to
see consistent fidelity to clear text, an effort to vindicate any fairly
discernible specific intent of the enacting Congress, decisions consistent
with the overall purpose of the statute, and respect for traditional state
law prerogatives unless areas of state autonomy were clearly superseded
interpreting statutory language as follows: "first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its
textual context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear
indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies").
108. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1997)
(arguing that construction of statutes should evolve with changes in society, economics, and business
in a manner consistent with the purposes of the enacting legislatures); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (suggesting that older statutes should be treated
like common law precedents that can, in compelling cases, be "overruled" by courts); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (noting
public policy considerations are frequently, if tacitly, used by courts in deciding cases and finding
such use appropriate and legitimate but questioning particular values emphasized in certain
decisions); Richard Stewart, The Reformation ofAdministrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 168384, 1813 (1975) (noting rising interest group influence on modem legislation and administrative
agency action but diffuse as to recommended reaction). See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note
35, Chs. 6-8 (reviewing approaches to statutory construction).
109. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation,supra note 43, at 324-45.
110. See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
413 (1989) (noting that statutory interpretation extends to administrative agencies attempting to
implement statutes).
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by a valid exercise of congressional power. Instead, we see a mixed
pattern of decision-making during the first six decades of the Act,
followed by growing infatuation with arbitration, reduced adherence to
the traditional ground rules of statutory construction, and most recently,
an appallingly bad decision-Concepcion--that tramples upon traditional
state contract prerogatives, federal civil disputing policy, and the
legislative intent and purpose underlying the Act.
III. THE PATH OF TAINTED LOVE: TRACKING THE COURT'S
ARBITRATION DECISIONS

As Shakespeare famously observed, "[t]he course of true love never
did run smooth.""' So it is with tainted love as well. Before the modern
Supreme Court's infatuation with arbitration, there was substantial
resistance, and sometimes outright hostility, to arbitration clauses
because they were seen as improperly depriving courts of jurisdiction.
The Federal Arbitration Act was prompted in large part by the business
community's dismay over such decisions and its persuasion of Congress
that legislative overruling of anti-arbitration decisions was in order.1 12
A personal favorite illustration of pre-Act judicial hostility to
arbitration is Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten v. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og
FoderstofKompagniet,often also known as the Atlanten or Korn-Og.113
In this case, decided shortly before the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act, the Court, affirming a Learned Hand trial court decision
and a Second Circuit decision, held that even what appeared to be a
broadly worded arbitration clause in a shipping contract between
merchants-with no discernible issues of consumer protection, consent,
etc.--does not require arbitration.114 The Court reasoned that the
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM act 1, sc.1.
112. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1380
(1991) (describing the historical judicial resistance to arbitration and the response by businesses and
legislators culminating in the Federal Arbitration Act); Stempel, supra note 104, at 270-90 (noting
the degree to which some modem courts as late as the 1980s continued to resist enforcement of
arbitration agreements based on problematic "public policy" concerns about arbitration).
113. 252 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1920), affg 250 F. 935 (2d Cir. 1918), af'g 232 F. 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1916).
114. The arbitration clause in question included the following provision:
If any dispute arises the same to be settled by two referees, one to be appointed by the
Captain and one by charterers or their agents, and if necessary, the arbitrators to appoint
an Umpire. The decision ... shall be final, and any party attempting to revoke this
submission to arbitration without leave of a court shall be liable to pay to the other or
others, as liquidated damages, the estimated amount of chartered freight.
I11.
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arbitration clause was inapplicable because one party sought to arbitrate
an issue of breach of contract because the claim arose out of a breach of
the contract and not an issue related to performance of the contract." 5
Cases like Korn-Og were not that unusual. English courts resisted
specific enforcement of arbitration clauses on the ground that they
improperly ousted courts of their rightful jurisdiction, a view that was
largely adopted in the United States. In reaction, the commercial
community sought corrective legislation and obtained it with passage of
the Act, now codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.'6
A. The FederalArbitrationAct
The Act itself, which was passed in 1925 and had an effective date of
January 1, 1926,17 is rather short and straight-forward. After defining
key terms such as "commerce" and "maritime," the Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."

Section 3 provides that courts may issue a stay of judicial
proceedings in order to permit arbitration to proceed pursuant to an
Id. at 315.
115. See Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 232 F.
403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("The theory appears to be that such a provision is part of the execution of
the contract, a piece of its administration, and ought not to be construed as applicable to an entire
change of purpose which results in the abandonment by one party of the enterprise as a whole.").
The logic and anti-arbitration effect of Korn-Og is baffling and shows that even great minds like
Learned Hand can have bad days.
116. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 321-23 (summarizing pre-Act common law resistance to
arbitration and the gestation and passage of the Act).
117. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 14
(2006)). Section I of Pub. L. No. 282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) was codified and enacted into positive
law in Title 9 of the U.S. Code. Prior to that, the text of Title 9 containing the Act had been legally
viewed as "merely prima facie evidence of the law." S. REP. No. 664, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 1
(1947); see Philip E. Karmel, Note, Injunctions Pending Arbitration and the FederalArbitration
Act: A Perspectivefrom ContractLaw, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1373, 1373 n.2 (1987); Wesley A. Sturges
& Irving Olds Murphy, Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
ArbitrationAct, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 580 (1952).
118. 9 U.S.C. § 2(2006).
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enforceable agreement."' 9 Section 4 gives federal courts authority to
enter an order compelling arbitration if the petitioning party to a valid
arbitration agreement is "aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate."l 2 0 Several sections of the Act deal with
procedural matters.121
The Act provides strong support for enforcing arbitration awards,
specifying that federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment
based on the award, 12 2 which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party
the normal range of judgment collection tools under applicable
procedural law. Section 10 of the Act permits arbitration awards to be
challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower than those available in
litigation, specifically:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made. 123
The final section of the Act governs appeals and reflects the
congressional preference-largely through the 1990 amendments rather
than the original 1925 enactment-to reduce appellate challenges to proarbitration orders but to permit appellate review of orders refusing to

119. Id. § 3.
120. Id. § 4.
121. See, e.g., id § 5 (governing the appointment of arbitrators); id. § 6 (providing that
applications for relief are treated as motions); id. § 7 (allowing for use witnesses and subpoenas, and
setting fees); id § 8 (subjecting admiralty matters, such as seizure of vessels, to arbitration); id. § 11
(regulating modification and correction of errors in an arbitration award); id. § 13 (governing papers
and docketing); id. § 15 (providing for the inapplicability of the "Act of State" doctrine).
122. Id. § 9.
123. Id. § 10. Section 10 also specifically provides that a reviewing court may direct a rehearing
by the arbitrators if a ground for vacating the award is shown. Id
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compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings pending

arbitration. 124
B. The FirstFive Decades of Construing the ArbitrationAct
Despite passage of the Act, there remained some judicial resistance
to arbitration, as occasionally reflected in case law over the next fifty
years. Most prominent was Wilko v. Swan, which held-seemingly out
of the blue-that claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 were
not subject to arbitration, regardless of the clarity of the arbitration
clause, the knowing and voluntary consent of the parties, the standard
practice of the industry, or the expectations of the parties.12 5
In a similar vein was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,' 2 6
which the Court implicitly revisited and reversed in the watershed
Southland Corp. v. Keating'2 7 decision. In Bernhardt,the Court held that
the Arbitration Act was procedural rather than substantive and
consequently was subject to the Erie doctrine, which made Vermont law
applicable in the instant case.12 8 Under Vermont law, an arbitration
agreement of the type at bar was unenforceable.1 2 9 Hence, arbitration
was not required, regardless of the contracting circumstances.' 3 0
The Court took a more receptive approach to arbitration in the
context of labor arbitration in the Steelworkers Trilogy, three cases
involving disputes between the then-powerful United Steelworkers union
and companies with which it had collective bargaining agreements
providing for arbitration of workplace disputes. 131 Some argue that these
124. Section 16 states that "an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order" granting a
stay of litigation, directing/compelling arbitration, or refusing to enjoin an arbitration except
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which permits trial courts to certify for immediate review decisions
involving close legal questions where the judge believes earlier appellate review will expedite
ultimate disposition of the matter. Id. § 16(b)(l)-(4); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
125. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (ruling that enforcing an agreement to arbitrate was tantamount to
permitting a waiver of the substantive protections of the 1933 Act), overruled by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The dissenting Justices objected on the
ground that a forum selection clause requiring arbitration did not deprive a claimant of the
substantive benefits of the Act. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
126. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
127. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
128. 350 U.S. at 208.
129. Id. at 204-06.
130. See id Bernhardt was a diversity case, prompting the Court to apply the Erie doctrine in
concluding that rather than enforcing the Arbitration Act, the federal court sitting in diversity should
apply Vermont law, which prevented specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. Id at 212.
131. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564-66 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
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cases-rather than the Court's 1980s cases promoting arbitrationcomprise the inauguration of the modem era of Supreme Court precedent
In United Steelworkers v. American
favoring arbitration. 132
Manufacturing Co. and United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., the Court enforced arbitration agreements.' 33 In United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., the Court announced a
very deferential standard for the review of labor arbitration decisions,
holding that the decision would be confirmed by courts so long as the
arbitrator's decision "draws its essence" from the agreement.1 3 4 A cynic
might note that even a horribly erroneous decision can still deal with the
essence or core of the agreement giving rise to the dispute.
Because these three cases were so focused on labor arbitration rather
than commercial or consumer arbitration, they can be considered
precursors to the modem era. To be sure, the Court showed signs of
greater affection for arbitration, but that resulted largely from the Court's
view that arbitration is a particularly critical component of the collective
bargaining process and an established means by which labor peace is
preserved.' 35 As the Court's other 1960s and 1970s cases show, the

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 575-77 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 594-96 (1960).
132. See Linda R. Hirchsman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The FederalizationofArbitration
Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1306 (1985) (viewing the Steelworkers Trilogy as important but seeing
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction,
and Southland Corp. v. Keating as a "second" important arbitration trilogy); see also infra notes
162-222 and accompanying text (discussing Byrd, Moses H. Cone, and Southland).
133. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-69; Warrior,363 U.S. at 581-85.
134. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-99. The Enterprise Wheel standard of review of
labor arbitration awards actually differs from the standard of review set forth in section II of the
Federal Arbitration Act, which underscores the longstanding view that the Act was aimed directly at
commercial arbitration. Id; 9 U.S.C. § 11. In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court fashioned labor
arbitration law on the strength of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, which the
Court has construed to provide authority for common law development of federal labor law.
Warrior,363 U.S. at 577-78; see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(holding that federal law applies to suits under § 301(a)); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, an arbitration award is presumptively valid unless the
arbitrators have exceeded their powers or acted with bias or favoritism. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Moses H.
Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). Although this may not be
much different in practice than the Enterprise Wheel "draws-its-essence-from-the-agreement test,"
one can make a strong case that the same standard should apply to review of both labor and
commercial arbitration awards. See Mark W. Lee, Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: Refining the StandardofReview, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 993, 1011-17 (1985) (arguing
that the Act's standard better serves the public policy favoring labor arbitration).
135. See Am. Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-69 ("Arbitration is a stabilizing influence only as it serves as
a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that arise under the agreement.").
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Court was warming to arbitration but continued to have doubts about it
outside the labor arena.'36
In Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities,Inc., a plumbing and
heating subcontractor filed suit in Georgia to collect funds allegedly
owed it by the general contractor for a United States government missile
site and successfully resisted arbitration even though the contractor had
previously filed an action in New York seeking to enforce the arbitration
clause.1 37 The Court found that the subcontractor had adequately alleged
an issue regarding possible fraud regarding the procurement of the
arbitration agreement.' 38 This seems a classic case of "old" or traditional
commercial arbitration rather than the "new" or "mass" arbitration of
retail consumer matters that has troubled many.13 9 One might argue,
however, that the terms of the arbitration agreement unfairly subjected
the subcontractor to a seriously inconvenient forum.14 0 Notwithstanding
the Steelworkers Trilogy, Moseley suggested the Court's continuing
wariness toward arbitration.141
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the
Court held (arguably overruling Moseley) that a question of fraudulent
inducement as to the contract containing an arbitration clause was in the
first instance a question for the arbitrator.14 2 By giving arbitrators "first
dibs" on these questions, the Court appeared to approach a more
Continuing this substantial
favorable attitude toward arbitration. 14
deference to private dispute resolution agreements, the Court in Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. enforced a forum selection clause in a maritime
towing agreement, even though the party adhering to the towing contract
had relatively little bargaining power in light of the disabled condition of
its vessel.144 The case was regarded as a sign that the Court was
beginning to look more favorably on such private dispute resolution
agreements.14 5 Logically, this suggested a similar shift in the Court's
136. See infra text accompanying notes 137-61.
137. 374 U.S. 167, 168-71 (1963).
138. See id at 170-72.
139. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between traditional,
individualized, "old" style commercial arbitration and "new" standardized mass arbitration of
consumer, employment, and debtor-creditor disputes); see also Stempel, supra note 15.
140. See Stempel, supranote 112, at 1397 (discussing Moseley in detail).
141. Id.
142. 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
143. See id 403-06; Stempel, supra note 112, at 1390-92 (discussing PrimaPaint).
144. See 407 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1972).
145. See Harold G. Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law,
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attitude toward arbitration agreements. Zapata is another precursor to
the modem era, however, because it was a case of traditional commercial
arbitration rather than of new mass arbitration affecting consumers.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware involved a
dispute over wage claims. 146 The Court refused to enforce the standard
arbitration clause signed by workers in the financial services industry as
a condition of their employment because of a state law prohibiting
arbitration of wage claims. 14 7 Although this decision is now effectively
overruled by Southland and its progeny, 14 8 the latter cases are arguably
distinguishable in that the state law in Ware appears more directly aimed
against arbitration, while the state law in Southland was applicable to any
contract provisions waiving substantive rights as a condition of obtaining
a franchise. 14 9 In view of the Court's most recent arbitration decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, which refused to apply state contract
law to arbitration agreements despite the language of the Federal
Arbitration Act inviting its application,150 Ware is effectively dead
(absent a change in Court composition and a willingness to re-examine
the issue) and represents the Court's old skeptical concern about
arbitration rather than its newfound affection for arbitration.15 1

Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387, 398 (1973) ("When [Prima Paint] is read
together with Zapata one conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is that all agreements to arbitrate
as well as all reasonable selections of forums in international commercial contracts will be enforced
in the federal courts."); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law:
ConsensualAdjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 307 n.49 (1988)
(gathering commentary regarding Zapata); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the
United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 124, 127 (1973) (noting Zapata brought a
"more favorable climate for forum selection clauses"); Willis L. M. Reese, The Supreme Court
Supports Enforcement of Choice of Forum Clauses, 7 INT'L LAW. 530, 537 (1973) ("The initial
judicial hostility to such clauses appears to be on the wane . . .
146. 414 U.S. 117, 119 (1973).
147. Id. at 119-25, 140.
148. See infra notes 169-214 and accompanying text (discussing Southland and its overruling of
Bernhardt).
149. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2 (West 2007) ("[T]he court shall order the petitioner and
the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists."); Ware, 414 U.S. at 122-23.
150. See infra notes 386-423 and accompanying text (discussing Concepcion).
151. The issue of permissible state "interference" with arbitration is even a bit more complicated
because, in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,the Court struck down a Montana law requiring that
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements comply with certain disclosure requirements. 517 U.S.
681, 689 (1996). Casarotto clearly seems to constructively overrule Ware. See id. But in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court astonishingly suggested that even though it was preventing
application of California's judicially crafted doctrine of unconscionability as a contract defense, the
states might be free to enact the type of specific legislation that Court had struck down in Casarotto.
See infra notes 413-21 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of Concepcion).
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A year after Ware, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court
enforced an arbitration clause--one calling for arbitration in Francecontained in a sale-of-business agreement between a businessperson and
a large multinational company. 15 2 Although a trip to France is hardly the
greatest dispute resolution burden one might face, the Court's
enforcement reflects its general comfort with arbitration, at least in the
commercial context. But, as in Zapata, the Court was dealing with oldstyle commercial arbitration and not the new mass arbitration of
consumer complaints that would arise as a consequence of the Court's
pro-arbitration jurisprudence. 53 Even so, scholarly discussion of the
decision expressed concern that the franchisee dealing with the
manufacturer might lack sufficient independence, savvy, and bargaining
power, as well as concern that the language and reasoning of Scherk
could lead to more aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses
contained in consumer contracts.154
As of the mid-1970s, the Court's approach could be characterized as
one of greater acceptance of arbitration but with some continuing
concern or even outright hostility when arbitration clauses swept
statutory claims within their textual ambit. For example, in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., the Title VII claim of a union employee was held
to be beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the

152. 417 U.S. 506, 508-09, 512-20 (1974).
153. Id. at 517; see supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, PrivatizingSecurities Disputes Through the Enforcement
of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 408 (1987) ("Scherk is most commonly
acknowledged as standing for the proposition that international securities transactions are not subject
to the Wilko limitation on the enforceability of arbitration clauses. The case, however, stands for
much more than that."); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Avoiding the Protections ofthe FederalSecurities
Laws: The Anti- Waiver Provisions, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49, 57 (1980) ("[T]he Court in Scherk
does not appear to have limited its rationale to 'truly international transactions.' On the contrary, it
implied rather strongly that its holding applied to transactions having fewer foreign contacts than the
transaction in Scherk.") ; Brett Robert Chapman, Comment, The Case for Domestic Arbitration of
Federal Securities Claims: Is the Wilko Doctrine Still Valid?, 16 Sw. U. L. REV. 619, 641 (1986)
("The Supreme Court took care in both Mitsubishi and Scherk to distinguish the decisions from their
domestic equivalent. This distinction is without merit, for both decisions rest on an implied
recognition of the capabilities of foreign arbitral tribunals to make subjective findings of intent and
knowledge involving complex statutory rights. No rational basis exists for continued denial of
similar capabilities in their domestic counterparts."); Gail Elaine Papermaster, Note, Will the Courts
Sherck The Little Old Lady in Dubuque? The Impact of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver on the Individual
Investor in a Global Securities Market, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129, 146-47 (1985) ("The existence of
unequal bargaining power at the time an agreement is made argues strongly for inapplicability of
Scherk ..... ); Stephen C. Sieberson, Note, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. andArbitrationUnder the
Securities Exchange Act: A Comity of Errors, I J. CORP. L. 100, 119 (1975) ("The most satisfying
formulation would be one that focuses on the bargaining posture of the securities buyer.").
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collective bargaining agreement to which he was subject.'s Although
the decision can be fairly regarded as one merely interpreting the scope
of the arbitration clause and the nature of union-management dispute
resolution as opposed to a civil rights claim, the decision can also be read
as one applying a statutory or public policy exception to the Arbitration
Act.15 6 In any event, Alexander suggested that the Court remained at
least mildly skeptical about arbitration in some contexts.
For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
the Court held that a broadly worked arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement did not apply to the workers' Fair Labor Standards
Act claims.157 Barrentine stands pretty clearly as a case applying a
"statutory" claims exception to arbitration in the manner of Wilko v.
Swan.'5 8 After Barrentine, the Court, although not overtly hostile to
arbitration, continued to limit its reach and deny arbitrability for certain
types of cases.'" 9 In McDonald v. City of West Branch, in a fashion quite
similar to Barrentine, the Court refused to compel arbitration of civil
rights claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,160 suggesting that the
Court had not yet fully embraced arbitration.161
C. The Modern Era ofArbitration at the Court
Within a short time after McDonald, the Court's affection for
arbitration solidified. Despite early-1980s cases such as Barrentine and
McDonald that reflected continued wariness about arbitration, by the
mid-1980s the Court had embarked on a new path. Decided during the
same term as McDonald,the Court in Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp. enforced an arbitration agreement in a
dispute over a construction project between the buyer-hospital and the
general contractor. 162 The hospital sought a state court order staying
arbitration proceedings notwithstanding that the construction contract

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
U.S.C.

See 415 U.S. 36, 38-43, 59-60 (1974).
See Stempel, supra note 104, at 321-23.
450 U.S. 728, 730, 745 (1981).
See id. at 740; supra notes 125 and accompanying text.
See Stempel, supra note 104, at 308-19 (discussing Barrentine).
466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984).
See Stempel, supra note 104, at 323-27 (discussing McDonald).
460 U.S. 1, 5, 29 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, Federal Arbitration Act, 9
§ 16(b)(1) (2006).
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contained a broadly worded arbitration clause committing all such
contracts-related disputes to arbitration. 163
The Court's decision to compel arbitration and reject the view that
Colorado River abstentionl64 was required of the federal court by notions
of deference to ongoing state proceedings' 65 made eminent sense. In
dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor argued that in its zeal to render the pro-arbitration ruling, the
majority had been too quick to find a sufficiently final order that
permitted appeal. 166 Legal realists might also note with some irony that
in Moses H. Cone, it was three of the Court's Republican-appointed
conservatives who had misgivings about the pro-arbitration resultexactly the opposite of the trend in the current Court.
What prompts some to see Moses H. Cone as the dawn of the
modem pro-arbitration era is its rhetoric favoring arbitration.16 7 More
substantively, the Moses H. Cone majority states that the Act
"create[s] ... a substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act."' 68 In other words,
the Act appeared to apply in state courts as well as in federal court. But
this issue was not prominently addressed until the Court's next important
arbitration case.
Although the Moses H. Cone decision favored
arbitration, it was not the full-fledged infatuation that came in Southland
Corp. v. Keating,16 9 which most regard as the dawn of the Court's
modem pro-arbitration jurisprudence.

163. Id at 5-7.
164. ColoradoRiver abstention, named after Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21 (1976), occurs when a federal court dismisses or stays proceedings
based on the existence of concurrent state court proceedings involving the same parties and
controversy. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK, DAVID F. HERR & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 4.5 (8th ed. 2011).

165. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13-23.
166. See id.at 30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. See, e.g., id at 24 (majority opinion) (viewing section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act as "a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary"). The Court continued:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration... . The Arbitration Act established that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself
or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Id. at 24-25.
168. See id at 24.
169. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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Southland involved a dispute between the convenience store chain 7The franchise agreement
Eleven and a California franchisee.1o
contained a broadly worded arbitration clause,171 which the franchisor
sought to enforce in order to compel arbitration of the dispute.172 The
franchisee resisted, citing a portion of the state's franchise law that
forbade enforcement of waivers of franchisee rights. 73 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that an arbitration clause was in effect a waiver
of the franchisee's right to seek judicial relief in the event of a
controversy over the franchise agreement. 174 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. 75
Southland thus presented, in starker relief than Moses H. Cone, the
issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive federal law
that took precedence over contrary state law. The Supreme Court could
not alter the construction of a state statute declared by the state's highest
court, even if it found the reasoning-here, that agreement to arbitration
was a sufficient waiver of substantive rights to be forbidden under state
franchise law-flawed.17 6 If the decision was to be reversed, it had to be
because the state law was powerless against a federal law commanding
arbitration 7 7-as the Southland Court so found, over the dissents of
Justice Stevens'7 8 and Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Rehnquist).17 9
Southland, authored by Chief Justice Burger, who had been
promoting alternative dispute resolution from the bully pulpit of the
Chief's office,' 80 also appears to mark the beginning of an ideological
shift in that Republican and conservative Justices, who might otherwise
have opposed broad arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and
states' rights grounds, became arbitration advocates notwithstanding the
powerful pull these concepts normally exert over Republicans and
170. Id. at 3-5.
171. Id. at 4.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 4-5.
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 6.
176. See id. at 6-10 ("Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of the state statute
was 'drawn into question' on federal grounds by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to
resolve the question as a matter of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).").
177. See id. at 10-14 ("Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) which
provides for an appeal from a final judgment of the highest court of a state when the validity of a
challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal law.").
178. Id at 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 21. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. See infra note 21 1and accompanying text.
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conservatives. Justice Rehnquist would soon be largely supportive of
outcomes favorable to arbitration.'"
Although Justice O'Connor
continued to express opposition to the nationalization and
substantification of the Arbitration Act in Southland,18 2 and was later
joined by Justice Thomas, there are today no Republican-appointed
Justices opposing arbitrability in close cases. 83
The Southland majority embraced the modem view of the Act as
federal substantive law, relying in part on the statement to that effect in
Justice Brennan's Moses H. Cone opinion.' 84 Although acknowledging
that "the legislative history [of the Act] is not without ambiguities," the
Court found that "there are strong indications that Congress had in mind
something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in
the federal courts."185 The Court further found that "[i]n creating a
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress
intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements."l 86 Thus, the Court held "that
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violate[d] the
Supremacy Clause" and contained inconsistencies with the Arbitration
Act.187
Like Moses H. Cone, Southland can be defended as a reasonable
decision that does not reflect excessive swooning over arbitration as a
forum preferable to court. The text of section 2 of the Act certainly
admits of a substantive law construction even if it does not compel the
Southland result. The case was a commercial dispute akin to the type of
paradigmatic vendor-customer disputes that proponents of the Act had in
mind when lobbying for the legislation.' 88
Although franchisees
typically are smaller, poorer, and have less leverage than franchisors-at
least once the relationship commences-franchisees are usually
competent and often experienced businesspersons or they never would
181. See, e.g., infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text (discussing Byrd); infra notes 230-42
and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi).
182. 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See infra Part III.D (discussing modem cases in which Republican appointees and
conservatives support arbitration generally but oppose class-wide treatment of arbitrable disputes
while Democratic appointees and moderates/liberals oppose arbitrability in certain contexts).
184. See 465 U.S. at 14-15; supra text accompanying note 169.
185. 465 U.S. at 12.
186. Id.at 16 (footnotes omitted).

187. Id.
188. See
IAN
R.
MACNEIL,
AMERICAN
ARBITRATION
LAW:
REFORMATIONNATIONALIZATION-INTERNATIONALIZATION 89, 94 (1992) (noting proponents' concerns regarding

interstate business contracts).
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have been awarded the franchise. They are usually not business
innocents, and they seldom can credibly claim to be particularly
surprised by the presence of an arbitration clause in the franchise
agreement given the ubiquity of such clauses in business-to-business
contracts throughout the twentieth century.189
And unlike consumers signing form receipts before hurrying away
from a cash register or continuing to pay bills without reading inserted
brochures, franchisees would seem rather certain to have actually read
any arbitration clause in the franchise agreement-or at least reasonably
can be expected to have actually read the franchise agreement.
Becoming a franchisee is a major event in one's working life that
logically prompts some study of the terms and conditions insisted upon
by the franchisor. To perhaps state the obvious: no one forces a
franchisee to become a franchisee. If a franchisor's terms are too
unfavorable, the a prospective franchisee continues to have what appears
to be the fine option of hanging on to his or her savings, avoiding the risk
of a failed franchise, and continuing to work at whatever had provided
the prospective franchisee with the funds that made her eligible for a
franchise in the first place.
In short, it is difficult to cry very hard for the losing franchisee in a
case like Southland, provided that the arbitration forum in which the
dispute is heard is a fair one and the procedures available permit
adequate factual development of issues involved in the dispute.
Southland only required arbitration.' 90 It did not declare that 7-Eleven
was certain to win.
Southland can thus be defended as a fair result consistent with the
general support for arbitration reflected in the Act and motivated by
reasonable public policy concerns in favor of consistency among state
and federal courts regarding enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Southland may reflect love for arbitration, but this is not the
tainted, reckless love the court would later shower upon arbitration.191
But neither is Southland a particularly encouraging example of the
High Court in action. Although the majority has a plausible textual
construction of the Act, it can also be argued that the Act's language
189. See, e.g., Edward Wood Dunham, William A. Darrin, Jr. & Benjamin A. Levin, Franchisor
Attempts to Control the Dispute Resolution Forum: Why the FederalArbitration Act Trumps the
New Jersey Supreme Court's Decision in Kubis, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 237, 238 (1998) (noting that
"[m]any franchisors use arbitration").
190. 465 U.S. at 17.
191. See supra Part I (discussing the Court's infatuation with arbitration through the years).
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stating that arbitration agreements may be avoided on "grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"l92 includes
illegality under applicable state law such as the California Franchise
Investment Act. Although it would not be well articulated for another
decade or so,1 93 a natural reading of this statutory language also clearly
such as fraud,
state contract law concepts
encompasses
misrepresentation, and unconscionability (both procedural and
substantive) that can support setting aside contract terms such as
arbitration clauses if the terms are deemed sufficiently oppressive.
The majority has a plausible view of the legislative history.19 4 But
Justice O'Connor's dissent is much more thorough in its exploration of
legislative history and quite convincing in its argument that the Act was
always intended by Congress only to apply to federal court proceedings,
which were, at the time, the proceedings with which the commercial
proponents of the Act were concerned.' 95 In an important illumination of
the result-orientation of the Southland majority, Justice O'Connor notes
96
which had viewed
that Southland is effectively overruling Bernhardt,1
the Arbitration Act as procedural and thus applied Eriel97 to require that
the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause litigated in
Vermont federal court be decided by Vermont law.198 But the Southland
majority does not even cite Bernhardt, let alone address it and explain
why its reasoning some thirty years earlier-much closer to the time the
Arbitration Act was passed-was in error.
This failure suggests that the Southland majority may have been
excessively intent on expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on
personal preference grounds rather than giving the issue the careful
reading of precedent that it deserved. Even if one agrees with the
Southland majority that the time had come to consider the Act as
substantive federal law applicable in state court, the Bernhardt-Erie

192. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
193. See Stempel, Bootstrappingand Slouching, supra note 11, at 1385-86 (discussing different
ways in which the Federal Arbitration Act has been and can be interpreted).
194. For the majority's discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, see
Southland, 465 U.S. at 12-16.
195. Id. at 25-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 23 (noting that Bernhardt found "the duty to arbitrate a contract dispute is
outcome-determinative ... and. . . governed by state law in federal diversity cases"). For a
discussion ofBernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ofAmerican, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), see supra notes 12630 and accompanying text.
197. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
198. Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 202-05.
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question at least needed to be addressed. Instead, the Southland majority
dodged the issue-another indication of the Court's rush to embrace
arbitration notwithstanding the normal rules of adjudication in the face of
contrary precedent.
Both Justice O'Connor's dissent and Justice Stevens' concurrence
and dissent in Southland make a strong case that the majority's
application of the Act is inconsistent with the federalism and states'
rights concerns that not only tend to animate U.S. law but also appear to
have been on the mind of the enacting Congress. Justice Stevens, in
addition to noting Justice O'Connor's compelling review of the
legislative history of the Act, focuses on the importance of states' rights
and federalism as a strong background norm of statutory interpretation:
The general rule prescribed by § 2 of [the Act] is that arbitration
clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are enforceable as
a matter of federal law. That general rule, however, is subject to an
exception based on such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. I believe that exception leaves room for the
implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be
undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.
The exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by
State law will not be deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress ....
The limited objective of the Federal Arbitration Act was to abrogate
the general common law rule against specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements . . ..

[B]eyond this conclusion, which seems

compelled by the language of § 2 and case law concerning the Act, it is
by no means clear that Congress intended entirely to displace state
authority in this field... . [W]e must be cautious in construing the act
lest we excessively encroach on the powers which Congressional
policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the states ....
... The existence of a federal statute enunciating a substantive federal
policy does not necessarily require the inexorable application of a
uniform federal rule of decision notwithstanding the differing
conditions which may exist in the several States and regardless of the
decisions of the States to exert police powers as they deem best for the
welfare of their citizens. Indeed, the lower courts generally look to
State law regarding questions of formation of the arbitration agreement
under § 2 ....
A contract which is deemed void is surely revocable at law or in equity,
and the California Legislature has declared all conditions purporting to
waive compliance with the protections of the Franchise Investment
Law, including but not limited to arbitration provisions, void as a
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matter of public policy. Given the importance to the State of franchise
relationships, the relative disparity in the bargaining positions between
the franchisor and the franchisee, and the remedial purpose of the
California Act, I believe this declaration of state policy is entitled to
respect.199
The opinion by Justice Stevens, like much of his judicial work,
makes its insights concisely but powerfully and stakes out a moderate
position consistent with his overall approach to law. 2 00 He respects the
text of the statute but does not read it woodenly or hyper-literally.
Instead, he reads the text with a healthy reverence for the legislative
history of the law that may shed light on specific legislative intent. He is
mindful of the purpose of the statute and practical realities of modem
commerce and regulation. He respects state prerogatives in an area of
traditional state autonomy and the federalist model of U.S. government
and law. He is willing to read the Act as laying down substantive law
applicable in state as well as federal court, but he gives breathing space
to state contract law and regulation. He appreciates that the California
franchise law is not an anti-arbitration law but a franchisee protection
law, which arguably takes it out of the broad reach of the Act'S 2 0 1
compelling of arbitration and puts it into the savings clause of section 2
of the Act.

199. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 386
(2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. See BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE
200-03 (2010) (discussing Stevens's independent approach to law); Symposium, The Finest Legal
Mind: A Symposium in CelebrationofJustice John PaulStevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1263 (2011). Articles
in this symposium noted Justice Stevens's eclectic, flexible, and centrist approach to legal issues that
contrasted with more doctrinaire Justices of the left or right. See, e.g., Justin Driver, Judicial
Inconsistency as Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1263, 1264 (2011) (discussing
different views of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence and tenure on the Court); Jamal Greene, The Rule
ofLaw as a Law ofStandards, 99 GEO. L.J. 1289, 1290 (2011) (describing Justice Stevens as "more
a justice of standards than a justice of rules"); see also Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557 (2006); John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About
Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2009-10 (2006) (describing Justice Stevens's
approach to statutory interpretation).
In his lone dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery, in fewer than two pages, Justice
Stevens demolishes the majority's concern that wage regulation of local government employees was
too much of a federal intrusion on state sovereignty to withstand Tenth Amendment scrutiny. See
426 U.S. 833, 880-81 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Within a decade, the full Court came to
appreciate his wisdom and overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
201. 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006).
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Justice Stevens also correctly recognizes, in light of Justice
O'Connor's strong arguments based on legislative history, that the
Southland majority is engaging in what might be termed "dynamic" or
"evolutive" statutory construction202 by adapting the 1925 legislation to
1984 commercial reality. Even though he was not persuaded of the
applicability of the Act to the California Franchise Investment Act, he
noted that "Justice O'Connor's review of the legislative history ...
demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute viewed the
statute as essentially procedural in nature," and he observed that
"intervening developments in the law" nonetheless compelled the
conclusion reached by the Court-that the Act is substantive law.203
The opinion by Justice Stevens in Southland sets a standard by which
we can assess the Court's arbitration jurisprudence in the emerging proarbitration or "infatuation" era. Unlike the majority opinion, Justice
Stevens' opinion is consistent with mainstream statutory construction,
save perhaps that dynamic statutory construction has not been expressly
embraced by the legal mainstream, even though the Court sometimes
applies it implicitly, as did the Southland majority. 20 4
Rightly or wrongly, Southland is an example of dynamic or evolutive
statutory construction. The majority expanded the reach of the statute
beyond the specific intent of the enacting Congress-and perhaps
beyond the basic purpose of the statute as well-although the Southland
result can be defended, in part, on broad legislative grounds (i.e., general
congressional support for arbitration). But in its sub silentio dynamism,
the Southland majority arguably over-reads the text of the Act and
minimizes or ignores traditional mainstream concerns of federalism,
historical practice, restraint in expanding congressional power absent a
clear statement, and deference to traditional state prerogatives.
That the Southland majority was at least partially blinded by love
because of its substantive attraction to arbitration seems clear in light of
the membership of the Southland majority. Majority opinion author
Chief Justice Burger is widely regarded as a jurisprudential conservative,
one who would never embrace dynamic or evolutive statutory
construction.20 5 Similarly, he was a supporter of states' rights.20 6 One
202. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the evolutive/dynamic statutory
construction approach).
203. Southland,465 U.S. at 17, 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing evolutive approaches to statutory
construction).
205. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 239 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting the Chief
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would not have expected Chief Justice Burger to overturn-without so
much as a mention or nod-precedent that has stood for thirty years, like
20 7
and to dramatically expand the reach of a federal statute
Bernhardt,
beyond the conceptions of the drafters.
Judge Posner once observed, with perhaps uncomfortable accuracy,
that most judicial conservatives tend to be strict constructionists of
legislation because they usually wish the statute had not gone so far,
while most judicial liberals tend to be "no constructionists" because they
wish the statute had gone further.208 But where arbitration was
concerned, Chief Justice Burger ran counter to this stereotype, as would,
in time, the remainder of the Court's conservatives. Southland finds
Chief Justice Burger pretending that the legislative history of the Federal
Arbitration Act clearly favors compelled arbitration, 20 9 an unpersuasive
argument even if one likes the outcome in Southland. He similarly reads
the text of the law in a manner friendly to the party desiring arbitration210
rather than a manner supportive of the State of California, even though
the statutory text clearly embraces the use of standard state contract
law-and perhaps any state law affecting contracts so long as it is not an
unreasonable impediment to federal policy. Under the standard rules of
statutory interpretation, California should have received more judicial
deference than 7-Eleven. Instead, the Court came to 7-Eleven's rescue,
invoking national legislation to steamroll state regulatory efforts-hardly
the stuff one expects from a mainstream or conservative Court such as
the one sitting during the 1983 Term.
In Southland, Chief Justice Burger was not being true to his
professed jurisprudential self. He was, however, being true to his
personal preference and public-policy self. Chief Justice Burger had
long been a strong supporter of alternative dispute resolution and a
strong critic of what he perceived as an unwise litigation explosion.211
Justice's general conservatism); HALL, supra note 37, at 384-87 (describing Chief Justice Burger as
a judicial conservative).
206. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 247 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting the Chief
Justice's, and other Justices', general support for state prerogatives); HALL, supra note 37, at 384-87
(describing Chief Justice Burger as supporter of states' authority, particularly in criminal matters).
207. 350 U.S. 198 (1956); see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
208. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 293 (1985).
209. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1984) (using the Arbitration Act's
legislative history to infer that Congress meant for it to have a broad reach).
210. Id.
211. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends
in Adjudicatory Procedureand LitigationReform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 688-705 (1993) (noting

the anti-litigation turn taken by legal elites in part as a response to Chief Justice Burger's efforts,
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Similarly, one could credibly accuse the other Justices in the majority of
inconsistency driven by a personal preference for more arbitration and
less litigation, or out of a view that the time, expense, and procedural
protection of litigation, including lay jury trials, offers an unfair
advantage to deadbeat franchisees or saddles businesses with undue
transaction costs in seeking to enforce their franchise agreements.
Joining the Southland majority opinion were Justices Brennan,
White, Blackmun, and Powell.212 With the exception of Justice Brennan,
who espoused support for a "living Constitution" to be interpreted
consistently with changes in American society (but who seldom
embraced statutory dynamism with equivalent zeal) and who tended to
favor federal authority over state authority in many cases,213 these
Justices were traditionalists who eschewed dynamism for original
legislative intent and federalism over unitary control by a central
214
But in Southland they embraced a result seemingly at
government.
including the 1976 Pound Conference, which criticized litigation as wasteful and inefficient, and
extolled the virtues of alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration).
212. See 465 U.S. at I (Burger, C.J., majority opinion); id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); id. at 21 (O'Connor, J. and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
213. In Southland, however, Justice Brennan arguably acted inconsistently with his general
sympathy for less powerful litigants such as workers, women, racial and ethnic minorities, and small
businesspersons.

See generally SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL

CHAMPION (2010) (tracing the life, career, and judicial philosophy of Justice Brennan).
214. See ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 233-34 (reviewing the Burger Court and noting that
Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell were generally viewed as moderates, and observing that when
Justice Blackmun first joined the Court, his voting was more conservative and closer to that of Chief
Justice Burger); HALL, supra note 37, at 368-71, 388-95 (describing Justice White as a moderate
and recounting Justice Blackmun's close voting record with Chief Justice Burger); see also LINDA
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 102-21 (2005) (noting Justice Blackmun's general

drift toward more liberal stances during the latter half of his time on the Court).
Both Justices Blackmun and Powell arguably were selected for the Court because of their
moderation. Prior to their emergence as candidates for the Court, President Nixon had nominated G.
Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth to open seats, only to have both run into confirmation
problems. ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 10-13. Nixon needed to submit new names of candidates
who would not have the arguable problems of competence--Carswell--or conflict of interestHaynsworth-(although the allegations against Haynsworth, a respected Fourth Circuit judge, are
not, in the wisdom of hindsight, considered unfair by most observers) as well as having sufficient
centrist tendencies that Democrats would not fight as too conservative. Id. Justice Powell, a former
ABA president, and Justice Blackmun, a long-time Eighth Circuit judge and former counsel to the
Mayo Clinic, both fit the bill as impeccable mainstream candidates for the Court. HALL, supra note
37, at 389, 393; ABRAHAM, supra note 37, 13-15 (describing President Nixon's appointments of
Justices Blackmun and Powell to the Supreme Court). For other descriptions of President Nixon's
appointment process, see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT & LEGAL

CHANGE: ABORTION & THE DEATH PENALTY 16-17 (1992); RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS
OF RICHARD NIXON 415, 420-24 (1978); RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT NIXON: ALONE IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 126, 132, 134, 151-52, 164, 185-86 (2001); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 303 (2005); Michael A. Genovese, Richard M
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odds with their professed jurisprudential philosophies. The logical
catalyst for this departure from their traditional moorings in Southland
was a substantive preference for arbitration, even if this group was not
overtly cheerleading for alternative dispute resolution and decrying
litigation.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, decided in 1985, the year after
Southland, the Court continued in a pro-arbitration vein, but a defensible
one. 2 15 The issue was whether a customer's mixture of federal securities
claims-not arbitrable because of Wilko 216-and state law claimsclearly arbitrable by themselves under the Act-prevented arbitration of
the state claims because they were intertwined with the non-arbitrable
federal claim. 2 17 Resolving a split in the circuits, the Court rejected the
intertwinement doctrine that had required all claims to go to litigation
and held that arbitration of the state law claims could be compelled and
need not await resolution of the securities claims.2 18 The Court
recognized that there could be preclusion issues, depending on which
adjudication took place first, but it did not attempt to provide guidance
on that issue. 2 19 The Byrd decision was unanimous, 220 a reflection of its
reasonableness under the circumstances-the Court was saddled with the
Wilko precedent that was steadily falling out of fashion. The Byrd
opinion supports more arbitration rather than less, but it can hardly be
viewed as unduly colored by personal preferences for arbitration.
Concurring separately, Justice White, a member of the Moses H.
Cone and Southland majorities, and a consistent supporter of arbitration
during his time on the Court, criticized Wilko, noting that the holding
involved only claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and that courts
cannot assume the same reasoning applies to claims brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.221 Justice White argued that there were
sufficient differences between the laws such that Wilko's restriction on
arbitration should be confined strictly to claims under the 1933 Act.2 22
Nixon and the PoliticizationofJustice, in WATERGATE AND AFTERWARD: THE LEGACY OF RICHARD

M. NIXON 79 (1992).
215. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
216. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989); see supra notes 125 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Wilko).
217. Byrd, 470 U.S. at214.
218. Id. at 223-24.
219. Id.at 221-24.
220. Id. at213.
221. Id. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
222. Id
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Although Justice White's attempt to differentiate the statutes is not
particularly persuasive, it is an important small step toward overruling
Wilko-and its shaky reasoning based on the 1933 Act and the Burger
Court majority's personal public-policy preferences-and removing
statutory restrictions on arbitration.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
Court again supported arbitration, dealing an implicit blow to cases like
Wilko, Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald that had restricted
223
The Court found no legal barrier to
arbitration for statutory claims.
requiring arbitration of antitrust claims raised by an automobile retailer
in its dispute with the manufacturer.2 24 The contract between the retailer
and the manufacturer, as might be expected in this commercial setting,
contained a broadly worded arbitration clause.22 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun found no basis in
statutory text, legislative intent or purpose, or public policy for cutting
back the scope of the arbitration agreement merely because one of the
bases of dispute involved a federal statute.226 In reaching this result, the
Court sounded more loudly the death knell of Wilko and similar cases
that opposed arbitration of certain claims based on public policy grounds.
"[W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims," wrote Justice Blackmun. 2 27 The majority opinion reiterated
and
much of the pro-arbitration rhetoric of Moses H. Cone, Southland,
228
arbitration.
favoring
policy
federal
PrimaPaint about the strong
Lost in some of the rhetoric was the better interpretation that
Congress intended to mandate enforcement of validly made arbitration
agreements more than it was making a general endorsement of arbitration
under all circumstances. But the arbitration clause at issue between these
merchants did not raise serious issues of consent, construction, fraud,

223. 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (discussing Wilko
and Barrentine); supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (discussing Alexander); supra notes
160-61 and accompanying text (discussing McDonald).
224. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
225. See id at 617 (discussing the terms of the sales contract).
226. Id. at 636-40.
227. Id at 625.
228. Id at 625-26 (analyzing Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Prima Point); see supra notes
142-43 and accompanying text (discussing Prima Paint); supra notes 162-69 and accompanying
text (discussing Moses H. Cone), supra notes 169-214 and accompanying text (discussing
Southland).
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coercion, or other bases for setting aside the agreement.229 The party
resisting arbitration hoped that the Court, like some lower courts, would
find antitrust law too sacred to be submitted to arbitrators, even at the
request of the parties.
Mitsubishi can thus be seen as part of the arbitration trend of the
1980s, but not a case where the Court is unduly infatuated with
arbitration. Certainly, the entire Court was not infatuated. 23 0 The
Court's rejection of a statutory claim defense to arbitration was rejected
by only a 5-3 majority. 23 1 At this juncture, one can argue it is the
dissenters who are unfaithful to their normal jurisprudential approaches
of applying the statute as written with appreciation of legislative intent,
congressional purpose, and the norms of contract formation and
enforcement.
In dissent, Justice Brennan, the author of Moses H. Cone and part of
the Southland majority, suddenly positioned himself against arbitration
merely because the case involved an antitrust claim. 232 Despite
dissenting here, Justice Marshall had also been part of the Moses H.
Cone and Southland majorities. Justice Stevens' dissent was arguably
inconsistent with his prior positions as well, but the issues in Southland
are distinct from the statutory exception question presented in Mitsubishi
and prior cases such as Wilko, Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald.
But Justice Stevens is also arguably consistent in his respect for stare
decisis. 2 33 He often took the position that precedents, even precedents he
viewed as incorrect at the time decided, should be respected going
forward, absent very strong intervening events counseling overruling.234
His dissent can be defended as merely seeking to treat antitrust claims
the same as 1933 Securities Act claims (and perhaps 1934 Act claims as
229. See Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 617.
230. Id at 640 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did not
participate in the decision. Id.
231. Id. at 614 (majority opinion).
232. See id at 640 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 650 (concluding that because the Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction
between federal statutory rights and contract rights and that arbitration has been used almost entirely
in labor and commercial disputes, a presumption exists that arbitration clauses do not apply to
federal statutory claims).
234. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (adhering to precedent
even though "contemporary ... jurisprudence might not dictate the same result were the issue to
arise for the first time today"); Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409,
420, 423-24 (1986) (refusing to reject settled Court precedent even assuming the decision "was
unwise as a matter of [public] policy" and that its reasoning had been undermined by subsequent
procedural and judicial developments, as these developments "are insufficient to overcome the
strong presumption of continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute").
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well), Title VII claims, Fair Labor Standards Act Claims (FLSA), and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims-all of which had been exempted to a degree from
arbitration in the Court's prior decisions.2 35 At this juncture, Justice
Stevens was willing to embrace the statutory exception perhaps as much
for its pedigree as for its rationale.236
But Justice Stevens in his Mitsubishi dissent appears to be more than
just a reluctant follower of precedent.237 He seems to enthusiastically
embrace the notion that there is something different about statutory
claims that makes them unsuitable for arbitration-or at least outside the
intended scope of the Arbitration Act. 2 38 Justice Stevens, whose
Southland dissent was so persuasive, had a tough position to defend in
Mitsubishi, where the dissent is considerably less convincing. The text
of the Arbitration Act contains no restraint on statutory claims. 23 9 The
legislative history reflects no congressional aversion to arbitration of
such claims. 24 0 The purpose and background of the statute, although
contract-focused and praising commercial actor expertise, do not suggest
that Congress viewed arbitrators as incompetent on statutory claims.24 1
Pragmatically, it would also appear odd and inefficient to separate
antitrust claims from the rest of a dispute that arbitrators must hear in any
event. But whatever one's views on the merits, the case, while proarbitration, does not reflect unbridled infatuation with arbitration. 24 2
235. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 647-50 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court has not allowed arbitration under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, Title VII,
FLSA, and § 1983).
236. C.f Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(asserting that service of process on a nonresident defendant who is physically in the forum state at
the time of service satisfies due process because of longstanding custom and that for service
conferring personal jurisdiction its "validation is its pedigree").
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
238. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 650-57 (Stevens, J., Brenan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting)
(describing the unique nature of the antitrust statutes).
239. See supra Part II.A.
240. See supra note 194; see also I IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J.
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT §§ 8:1-8:2 (1994) (discussing the Arbitration Act's legislative history).
241. Id.
242. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers ofAmerica is a bit of driftwood on the
generally rising tide of arbitration. 475 U.S. 643 (1986). Although continuing to give rhetorical
support to arbitration, the Court finds that the instant labor-management dispute does not fall within
the scope of what appears to be a very broadly worded arbitration clause-at least it did not fall
within the confines of PrimaPaint,which requires that questions regarding defenses to the contract
are in the first instance for the arbitrator. Id. at 651-52. Instead, the Court found that the trial court
that should initially assess the scope of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement
at issue. Id. at 652. The Court was unanimous, with Justice White authoring the majority opinion,
id at 645, and Justice Brennan concurring in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
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Two Terms later, the Court advanced the cause of arbitrability and
sounded the death knell of Wilko in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon.24 3 Picking up on Justice White's concurrence in Byrd,244 the
Court refused to extend the securities law statutory exception from Wilko
to claims made pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, holding
the agreement to arbitrate enforceable under the Federal Arbitration
Act.245 Although the 1933 Act exception from Wilko was not dead yet, it
was living on borrowed time in that the rationale for refusing a statutory
claim exception in McMahon is equally applicable to and powerful
regarding 1933 Act claims that were at issue in Wilko.246 The McMahon
Court also rejected the argument that claims made pursuant to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were
exempt from arbitration, a view shared by the entire Court, that also runs
counter to the notion of the existence of a statutory claims or public
policy exception to arbitrability.24 7
McMahon was thus an important pro-arbitration opinion in the sense
that it set the stage for further curtailment of the statutory claims
exception to arbitrability.
Symbolically, Justice O'Connor, who
dissented so strongly in Southland, wrote the McMahon majority
opinion. To be fair, her view in McMahon is not inconsistent with her
Southland view that the Act applies only in federal court proceedings
because McMahon was federal court litigation. But her emerging
enthusiasm for arbitration at least looks a little odd when compared to
her resistance to it just three years earlier.
Justice Blackmun, as joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented, arguing that the 1934 Act was sufficiently similar to the 1933
Act such that the McMahon claim should enjoy the protection against
arbitrability provided by Wilko.248 Scoring some points in opposition to
arbitration, the dissent noted that in 1975 Congress made extensive
amendments to the 1934 Act and it appeared from the legislative history
that "Congress did not want the amendments to overrule Wilko" and that
Marshall. Id at 652 (Brennan, J., concurring)..
243. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
244. 470 U.S. 213 (1985); see supra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
245. 482 U.S. at 238.
246. See Stempel, supra note 104, at 294 (likening Wilko's status to that of a "wounded animal
limping across the Savannah," sure to be attacked again after McMahon's undercut its rationale).
247. 482 U.S. at 238-42 (concluding that an arbitral forum would not adequately vindicate RICO
claims and that enforcement of the arbitration clause did not constitute a waiver of substantive rights
under the statute).
248. See 482 U.S. at 243.
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"[legislative history of] an amendment to the Exchange Act suggests that
Congress was aware of [and approved] the extension of Wilko to § 10(b)
claims [made under the 1934 Act]."249
Although on the losing side of this significant battle, the dissenters
fought hard against the constriction and foreshadowed demise of Wilko.
The dissenting opinion is longer than the majority opinion.250 But the
decision has some reasonable jurisprudential support in seeking to treat
all claims as equal for purposes of arbitrability. 251 The decision is not so
much one enamored of arbitration as it is a reflection of the absence of
fear that arbitration might be too inferior a process for resolving statutory
claims. The Court is not hostile to arbitration, but neither is it in
arbitration's thrall.
The same year, in Perry v. Thomas, the Court struck another blow
In an opinion by Justice Marshall, it compelled
for arbitration.
arbitration of a wage claim in the face of a state law exempting wage
claims from arbitration.2 52 In effect, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Ware 2 53 was overruled while Southland254 was affirmed,
shoring up the strength of the pro-arbitration working majority of the
Court just four years after the watershed Southland decision. Perry
continued the Court's embrace of arbitration on the rhetorical level as
well as making substantial citation to the Court's recent pro-arbitration
decisions. 2 55 The message to even the casual reader is pretty clear:
arbitration is generally strongly supported by the Court, even in the face
of contrary state law.
Perry is generally susceptible to the same bases of praise or scorn
one might heap on Southland. The majority, with Justices Marshall,
Burger, Blackmun, Brennan, and White, purports to embrace mainstream
jurisprudence but arguably neglects to consider core mainstream judicial
concerns of federalism, state prerogatives of contract regulation, and
legislative intent and purpose, and it reads the Arbitration Act's text too
broadly.25 6 But Perry may be better defended than Southland in that the
249. Id at 247 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Compare id. at 222-42 (majority opinion), with id. at 247-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
251. See id. at 226 (majority opinion).
252. 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
253. 414 U.S. 117 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
254. 465 U.S. I (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 169-214.
255. See Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-91.
256. See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous
Statutory Interpretation,Stare Decisis, and a ProposalFor Change, 53 ALA. L. REv. 789, 874-75
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California Labor Code § 229 at issue in Perry appears more directly
aimed at arbitration 25 7 and, thus, is in conflict with the now-deemedsubstantive federal law, while the California Franchise Investment Act at
issue in Southland was a broader prohibition against waivers of all types,
not solely arbitration clauses.258 Only Justices Stevens and O'Connor
dissented, each in separate opinions.2 59 Justice O'Connor reiterated her
view that the enacting Congress did not intend the Arbitration Act to
create substantive federal law applicable to state proceedings and echoed
Justice Stevens' view from Southland that the Act's own language
permits refusal to order arbitration if there were other bases under state
law preventing enforcement of the contract.260
Justice Stevens made a similar argument based on legislative intent
and purpose, and he defended an originalist notion of statutory
interpretation even though his Southland dissent had been relatively
dynamic in its approach to the statute.26 1
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50
years in 1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even

considered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted state-created
rights. It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively

rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress
certainly did not intend.26
Whatever the merits of the pro- and anti-arbitration perspectives
clashing in Perry, it seems odd that the majority did so little to defend its
position against the contention that it had been unfaithful to the
legislative intent and purpose of the law as well as the rights of the
sovereign states to regulate contractual undertakings. In essence, the
Perry majority rests on the analysis of Southland, which makes Perry
subject to the same criticisms and the same concern that enthusiasm for
arbitration has overwhelmed the Court's ordinary concern about the
intent and goals of the enacting Congress and protection of the states.
(2002).
257. See CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. § 229 (West 2011) (specifically stating that actions for payment
of wages may be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate").
258. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
259. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493-96 (Stevens, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
260. See id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 200.
262. 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to his Southland dissent and also contending
that "the States' power to except certain categories of disputes from arbitration should be preserved
unless Congress decides otherwise").
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In what could be regarded as a retreat from its ordinary preference
for arbitration, the Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University held that where a
contract containing an arbitration clause also selects specific state law as
applicable to the dispute, the state's law regulating arbitration
agreements supplants the Federal Arbitration Act.2 63 In this case, that
meant that California state law restrictions on arbitration were not
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act and could prohibit enforcement
of an arbitration agreement that was otherwise enforceable under federal
law. 2 64 The decision prompted the ire of Justice Brennan, who dissented
with Justice Marshall and contended that the ruling was a threat to the
overall enforceability of the federal law. 26 5 The dissent's argument is
that most of the same contracts that contain arbitration clauses contain
choice-of-law clauses as well. 26 6 Consequently, the dissent saw the
decision as a threat to the enforcement of a host of arbitration
agreements, seeming to overlook that contract drafters could easily write
their way around any potential problems by providing that federal law
controlled questions of arbitrability. Although the dissent may be
consistent with Justice Brennan's generally pro-arbitration views, it
seems inconsistent with dissents in other cases. In any event, Volt as a
whole suggests some limits on the Court's arbitral infatuation of the
1980s.
In Rodriguez de Quitas v. Shearson American/Express, Inc., the
Court completed the process begun in Byrd and McMahon and formally
overruled Wilko.2 67 The Court had now eliminated the rationale for
recognizing a statutory claims exception to arbitration as well as for
making 1933 Act claims subject to arbitration.26 8 Although the arbitral
exceptions for Title VII, FLSA, and § 1983 claims in prior case law were
not overturned, they appeared to be in jeopardy.
But in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the Court reaffirmed
its apparently continuing commitment to these public policy exceptions
to arbitrability by distinguishing them from Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) claims, for which the Court found no such
263. 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989).
264. See id at 470.
265. See id at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
decision. Id. at 479 (majority opinion).
266. Id. at 479 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
267. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
268. See id.

Justice O'Connor did not participate in the
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exception. 2 69 Notwithstanding the arguable support for exceptions from
arbitration for Title VII, FLSA, and § 1983 claims, arbitral infatuation is
dramatically present and ascendant in Gilmer.27 0 The case involved a
securities industry employee making an ADEA claim against the
brokerage house that fired him at age sixty-two. 27 1 The Gilmer majority,
in an opinion by Justice White, treats the case as simply one of whether a
statutory exception exists for ADEA claims and determines the answer is
"no," as per Rodriguez, McMahon, and Mitsubishi.2 72
The Court gave only glancing attention, in part because the issue was
raised late in the proceedings by Gilmer's amici,273 to a much stronger
argument contending that the Act itself, in its clear text, states that
arbitration clauses in employment contracts are not enforceable, at least
for workers engaged in interstate commerce.274
Rather than simply refusing to consider the section 1 argument
because of waiver, the Gilmer majority used a bit of linguistic sleight of
hand to avoid the issue:
In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1
exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not
contained in a contract of employment. The FAA requires that the
arbitration clause being enforced be in writing. The record before us
does not show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's
employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration
clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities
registration application, which is a contract with the securities
exchanges, not with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue
uniformly have concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the
269. 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
270. E.g., id. at 30 ("[GJeneralized attacks on arbitration ... are 'far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration]."' (quoting Rodriguez de Quvas,
490 U.S. at 481)).
271. Id. at23.
272. Id. at 23, 26.
273. See id. at 24 n.2 ("Several amici curiae in support of Gilmer argue that [section 1 of the
Act] excludes from the coverage of the FAA all 'contracts of employment.' Gilmer, however, did
not raise the issue in the courts below, it was not addressed there, and it was not among the questions
presented in the petition for certiorari.").
274. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2008) ("[Njothing herein contained [in the Act] shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."). Although an individual worker may be engaged in interstate commerce, he
or she might not be part of a class of workers regularly engaged in such commerce. Gilmer,
however, as a stock broker, surely fell within a common-sense meaning of the words of section I in
that securities brokers, dealers, agents, and sales and servicing employees most certainly are as a
group engaged in interstate commerce because of the nature of financial markets and the common
use of wire, mail, and telephone communications as part of their activities.
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FAA is inapplicable to arbitration clauses contained in such registration
applications.... Unlike the dissent, we choose to follow the plain
language of the FAA and the weight of authority, and we therefore hold
that § l's exclusionary clause does not apply to Gilmer's arbitration
agreement. Consequently, we leave for another day the issue raised by
amici curiae.275
The Gilmer majority's dismissive language begs the question of how
an arbitration clause can be sufficiently subject to the Act to be
enforceable by the employer if it is not contained in a contract between
the employer and employee. The success of the securities industry in
requiring that all its licensed brokers sign arbitration agreements would
logically make out a stronger case for extending section 1 protections to
those workers, who clearly must submit to the arbitration clause as a
condition of employment and where there is no reasonable alternative.m
Instead, the Gilmer Court defined the problem away through a legal
fiction.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, who raised troubling objections to the
Court's embrace of arbitration rather than federalism or legislative
history in Southland,2 77 offered a rather devastating rebuttal. 2 78 He
pointed out that the Court on many occasions has not strictly enforced
the concept of waiver in order to render a full assessment of a case before
it.279 He then noted the narrowness of the Court's concept of what
constitutes a "contract of employment:"
Given that the FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration
agreements between employees and employers, I see no reason to limit
this exclusion from coverage to arbitration clauses contained in
agreements entitled "Contract of Employment." In this case, the parties

275. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 n.2 (citations omitted). "Another day" came a decade later when the
Court decided Circuit City. 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that even where the arbitration
agreement was in a direct contract between employer and employee asserting a Title VII claim,
section l's exclusion was inapplicable because the employee, a retail electronics salesperson and
manager, was not part of a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce); see infra notes 320-28
and accompanying text.
276. See id. at 23 (noting that Gilmer was required by his employer to register with several stock
exchanges, his uniform application for registration provided for arbitration, and the New York Stock
Exchange has a rule providing for arbitration for registered representatives).
277. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding "no
evidence" that Congress intended to treat a state's definition of "invalid as contrary to public policy"
differently than the federal government's with respect to the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement).
278. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 36-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. See id. at 37.
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conceded at oral argument that Gilmer had no "contract of
employment" as such with respondent. Gilmer was, however, required
as a condition of his employment to become a registered representative
of several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) Just because his agreement to arbitrate any "dispute, claim or
controversy" with his employer that arose out of the employment
relationship was contained in his application for registration before the
NYSE rather than in a specific contract of employment with his
employer, I do not think that Gilmer can be compelled pursuant to the
FAA to arbitrate his employment-related dispute. Rather, in my
opinion the exclusion in § 1 should be interpreted to cover any
agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the employer
arising out of the employment relationship, particularly where such
agreements to arbitrate are conditions of employment.2 80
On the issue of the meaning of section 1, Justice Stevens marshals
equally compelling evidence of legislative intent to protect vulnerable
workers from unwanted arbitration agreements when they are seeking
work. 2 8 1 Although the legislative history focused on workers who were
constantly and visibly involved in physical movement across state lines,
this was a mere consequence of the involvement of the Seaman's Union
during the legislative process, which understandably used seamen as
their paradigmatic example of workers who should not be unfairly
saddled with nonconsensual arbitration agreements.282
Although the discussion of the employment exception in Gilmer is
necessarily truncated, it foreshadows the Court's ultimate unfortunate,
crabbed reading of section 1 in Circuit City, Inc. v. Adams. 28 3 In taking a
narrow view of section 1, the Court downplayed the text of the Act,
congressional intent, statutory purpose, and the federalism concerns of
the states in protecting workers from potentially unfair tribunals that
might be imposed upon the workers without their consent due to the
great leverage held by employers.2 84

280. Id. at 40. Justice Stevens then marshaled history and precedent supporting a broad reading
of the term "contract of employment" with respect to the Act. Id. at 40-41 (noting that collectivebargaining agreements have fit into the section I exclusion).
281. See id. at 41-42.
282. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsideringthe Employment ContractExclusion in Section I of
the FederalArbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary'sFailure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP.
RESOL. 259, 263-64 (reviewing the origin of the statutory provision and case law and arguing for a
construction of section 1 applicable to all workers involved in interstate commerce, rather than the
narrow railroad-trucker-seaman-only construction provided by some courts).
283. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001); see infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text.
284. See id. at 109 ("[T]he better interpretation is to construe the statute ... to confine the
exemption to transportation workers.").

HeinOnline -- 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 850 2011-2012

2012]

TAINTED LOVE

851

There is of course a jurisprudential inconsistency in the Court's
broad and aggressive reading of section 2 of the Act regarding the
enforceability of arbitration coupled with the Court's very narrow
reading of section 1 of the Act protecting employees from compelled
arbitration. Logically, section 1 should receive the same interpretative
treatment as does section 2. Given the legislative intent and statutory
purpose of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements between
merchants and halting judicial reluctance to specifically enforce clearly
consensual arbitration clauses, there is nothing inconsistent with a proarbitration view of the Act that also recognizes that the Act does not
extend its support of arbitration to the employment context.
Despite the tangential treatment of section 1 in Gilmer, the decision,
with only Justices Stevens and Marshall in dissent, suggests a Court
becoming more committed to arbitration as a process and willing to
depart from standard statutory construction to support this favored
process. Ironically, however, the same Court that was moving toward a
narrow view of section 1 and the degree of interstate activity required to
protect workers from unwanted pre-dispute arbitration clauses took a
broad view of interstate commerce regarding the reach of the Act
generally in its next case.
In a divided opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v.
Dobson, the Court held that the Arbitration Act reaches as broadly as the
limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 285 The
division of the Court revolves around more technical issues of language
and procedure rather than basic orientation toward the Act.286 The
decision supports arbitration but was hardly a shocking break with
expectations, at least in light of the fact that the Act had been considered
substantive law for ten years since Southland and that the Court had
given a broad construction to the concept of interstate commerce at least
since the New Deal.287 Dobson continued the Court's support for
arbitration but is a defensible decision that simply looks bad when
juxtaposed with the Court's unwillingness to give pro-employee section
1 the same treatment accorded the Act generally.
285. 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
286. The concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor and the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia
and Thomas argue that the Act should not apply in state courts; they do not argue against the breadth
of section 2. See id. at 282-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id
at 285-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
287. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding Congress
has the power to control activities that have a "close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce").
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Nonetheless, Justices Scalia and Thomas were moved to dissent (at
length in the case of Justice Thomas), arguing that Southland was
wrongly decided.288 By this juncture, however, Justice O'Connor
appeared to have thrown in the towel.289 She still thought Southlandwas
wrongly decided but acknowledged its precedential authority and
concurred in the Dobson decision.2 90
As discussed below, Dodson was hardly the end of the Court's
"effort to expand the Federal Arbitration Act." 2 9 1 That would await
Justice O'Connor's retirement and the personnel changes of the Roberts
Court, which produced more infatuatedly and dramatically divisive proarbitration opinions restricting class action litigation and even class
action arbitration.292
During the same year Dodson was decided, the Court in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., refused to limit the
arbitrator's authority to award punitive damages in a case that turned
largely on choice-of-law principles and the peculiar New York rule that
punitive damages could not be awarded in arbitration.293 The decision is
pro-arbitration in that it favors greater remedial powers for arbitrators,
although that would not have been the case had the agreement in
question properly imported New York substantive law. But the decision
is also pro-consumer in that it provides the prospect of greater remedies
in the arbitrations into which more and more matters are being
funneled.294
On the whole, Mastrobuono is not a moment when the Court's
infatuation with arbitration is on display-the case is resolved on more
technocratic grounds.295 The uncontroversial nature of the ruling is
reflected in the 8-1 vote of the Court, with Justice Thomas dissenting on
the ground that the choice-of-law provision at issue in the case is not
materially different than the one in Volt, which required application of

288. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 284 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I agree with respondents ... that
Southland clearly misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act."); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("In my view, [stare decisis] is insufficient to save Southland.").
289. See id. at 283-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See infra Part III.D.
293. 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995).
294. See id at 61-64.
295. The Court based its decision on common law rules for contract interpretation, not on public
policy rationales supporting arbitration. Id at 62.
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29 6
California law at odds with the federal common law of arbitration.
Justice Thomas saw the New York law sought by the brokerage house as
insufficiently different to avoid the reach of New York's prohibition on
punitive damages in arbitration.297
In another 1995 decision, the Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, reaffirmed the general rule that, notwithstanding the federal
policy favoring arbitration, the question of whether an agreement
requires arbitration is for the courts and not the arbitrator.29 8 By contrast,
general questions going to the contract as a whole are initially for the
arbitrators as provided in Prima Paint and its progeny. 299 The actual
decision-making in such cases turns on whether a party resisting
arbitration has a challenge to the arbitration agreement itself or merely a
defense to the contract as a whole or some portion of the contract other
than the arbitration clause. 0 0 The Court held that "because the Kaplans
did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration,
the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the
dispute was subject to independent review by the courts."30 1 Regarding
standards of review, the First Options Court unanimously held that:

[T]here is no special standard governing [appellate] review of a district
court's decision [to confirm or vacate an arbitration award]. Rather,
review of, for example, a district court decision confirming an
arbitration award on the ground that the parties agreed to submit their
dispute to arbitration, should proceed like review of any other district
court decision finding an agreement between parties, e.g., accepting
that are not "clearly erroneous" but deciding questions
findings of fact 302
of law de novo.
In addition to being a middle-of-the-road, uneventful decision, First
Options tends to avoid the excesses of arbitral infatuation in its rhetoric,
approach, and decision, and it stands as a moment of relative lack of
passion by the Court regarding arbitration. But in another decision from
296. See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
470 (1989); see supra notes 263-66 and accompanying text (discussing Volt).
297. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976) (forbidding award of punitive damages in arbitration),
supersededby statute, Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2006).
298. 514 U.S. 938, 944-47 (1995).
299. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
300. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-07 (1967); see also
FirstOptions, 514 U.S. at 945-46.
301. FirstOptions, 514 U.S. at 947.
302. Id. at 947-48.
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that year, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, the Court
reverted to its pro-arbitration amore in refusing to apply the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) to prevent arbitration of a dispute in Japan
pursuant to a clause in a bill of lading for a shipment of oranges from
Morocco to Boston, which also included a Japanese choice-of-law
provision.303 COGSA provides that:
[a]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in
connection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in
the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such
liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void and of no effect.30
Given a plain reading, COGSA would appear to foreclose imposition
of an arbitration agreement if arbitration resulted in any shrinkage of
claimant remedies. But the Court majority avoided this seeming
command by holding that the arbitration and choice-of-law clauses were
not provisions "lessening . .. liability." 305 Justice Stevens explained in
dissent:
The foreign-arbitration clause imposes potentially prohibitive costs on
the shipper, who must travel-and bring his lawyers, witnesses, and
exhibits-to a distant country in order to seek redress....

The Court assumes that the words "lessening such liability" must be
narrowly construed to refer only to the substantive rules that define the
carrier's legal obligations. Under this view, contractual provisions that
lessen the amount of the consignee's net recovery, or that lessen the
likelihood that it will make any recovery at all, are [erroneously placed]
beyond the scope of the statute.
In my opinion, this view is flatly inconsistent with the purpose of
COGSA

§ 3(8).06

303. 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995).
304. 46 U.S.C. App.

§ 1303(8)

(2002) (current version recodified in notes for section of 46

U.S.C. 30701 (2006)).
305. VimarSeguros, 515 U.S. at536-37.
306. Id. at 549-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In effect, the majority, through its minimization of the practical
impact of the arbitration clause's dictating a distant and inconvenient
forum and distant applicable law, held that COGSA, enacted in 1936-a
decade after the Act-was trumped by the Act, notwithstanding that
COGSA is as much substantive law as the Act. Further, the case
presented a rather sympathetic shipper forced to adhere to a one-sided
contract that might well fail unconscionability analysis under state law.
As Justice Stevens' dissent noted, COGSA was enacted to correct such
problems.3 o?
Once again reviewing section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which
makes arbitration clauses specifically enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," 308
Justice Stevens observed that:
[t]his language plainly intends to place arbitration clauses upon the
same footing as all other contractual clauses. Thus, like any clause, an
arbitration clause is enforceable, "save upon such grounds" as would
suffice to invalidate any other, nonarbitration clause. The FAA thereby
fulfills its policy of jettisoning the prior regime of hostility to
arbitration. Like any other contractual clause, then, an arbitration
clause may be invalid without violating the FAA if, for example, it is
procured through fraud or forgery; there is mutual mistake or
impossibility; the provision is unconscionable; or, as in this case, the
terms of the clause are illegal under a separate federal statute which
does not evidence a hostility to arbitration. Neither the terms nor the
policies of the FAA would be thwarted if the Court were to hold today
that a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading "lessens liability"
under COGSA. COGSA does not single out arbitration clauses for
disfavored treatment; it invalidates any clause that lessens the carrier's
liability. Illegality under COGSA is therefore an independent ground
"for the revocation of any contract," under FAA § 2. There is no
conflict between the two federal statutes.309
Justice Stevens attributed the majority's error to "overzealous
formalism," 31 0 but the decision appears just as much to be a preference
for arbitration regardless of the text, intent, or purpose of the Act-a
preference embraced by the Court in spite of the Act's direction that
arbitration agreements be subject to the same contract-based defenses to

307. Id. at 550; see also id. at 545-46 (noting academic support for enforcing COGSA and
similar precedent authored by respected Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly).
308. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
309. Vimar Seguros, 515 U.S. at 555-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 556.
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enforcement listed by Justice Stevens. Just as disturbingly, Justice
Stevens dissented alone. A supermajority of the Court was sufficiently
infatuated by arbitration that it pursued it even in the face of contrary
substantive law.
Similar substantive preferences for arbitration over states' rights,
federalism, and the right to regulate were reflected a year later in
31
A Subway sandwich shop
Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.
franchisee sought to avoid arbitration of his dispute with the franchisor
based on the failure of the arbitration clause in the agreement to comply
with the requirements of a Montana statute, which provided that
"[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration ... shall be typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such
thereon, the contract may not be subject to
notice is displayed
3 12

arbitration."

Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held
the provision was in violation of the Arbitration Act because the state
law did not apply to the revocation of "any" contract but only to
arbitration agreements. 3 3 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion enjoyed a
supermajority, with only Justice Thomas in dissent, reiterating his view
that Southlandwas wrongly decided.314
Notwithstanding the strength of the Court's vote and its consistency
with federal appeals court decisions taking a similarly dim view of
analogous state laws, Casarotto reads like an opinion written by a court
in the sway of arbitration and wishing to promote it in spite of legitimate
countervailing state goals. The Montana statute is not a ban on specific
enforcement of arbitration clauses but simply a means of forcing
disclosure to attempt to ensure that arbitration agreements are
consensual.
The Montana law was vulnerable to preemption by the Act because it
singled out arbitration. But this presumably reflected state concern that
arbitration agreements presented particularly pressing problems of
disclosure, consent, and fairness. A Court less infatuated with arbitration
could have respected the traditional state domain of contract law and
been consistent with the Act. Although the state statute placed an
additional burden on the drafters of arbitration agreements, the burden is

311.
312.
313.
314.

517 U.S. 681 (1996).
Id. at 684 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (amended 1997)).
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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light, merely requiring a disclosure provision rather than imposing a
substantive bar to arbitration. Further, a Court less driven to require
arbitration could have considered other contract-based defenses to
arbitrability and whether Montana's information-forcing statute was
simply a form of similar state-centered policing of contracts.31
After a four-year break from arbitration cases, the new century saw
the Court return to the topic and largely continue its pro-arbitration
approach. 3 16 In Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama v. Randolph, the
Court ruled that an arbitration agreement that does not specifically set
forth information about the costs and fees of arbitration is nonetheless
enforceable. 3 17 The Court in effect rejected the view that such silence
was per se unconscionable as a matter of federal common law.318 Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, concurred in
part and dissented in part, arguing that instead of making a definitive
pronouncement on the issue, the Court should have remanded the case
for "closer consideration of the arbitral forum's accessibility" and
potential unconscionability in light of the lack of disclosure about costs
and fees. 31 9 This decision continued the Court's affection for arbitration
and reflected some division within the Court as well as the Court's
overall resistance to unconscionability analysis.
Then came Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, in which the Court
expressly addressed the issue it had dodged in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., albeit hinting at a bad result for workers
whenever forced to face the issues squarely. The Circuit City Court
ruled that section 1 of the Act, which prohibits enforcement of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts, did not apply to all workers engaged in
activity affecting commerce but only applied to those directly involved in
the interstate movement of goods.32 0 In reaching this result, the Court
315. See Stephen Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 31WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1002 (1996) (advocating a contractual approach to issues
of unconscionability in arbitration).
316. In Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., a unanimous and
uncontroversial decision, the Court held that the venue provisions of the Arbitration Act are
permissive and allow a motion for confirming, vacating, or modifying an arbitration award to be
filed either in the federal district court where the award was made or in any other federal district
court where venue is proper under the general venue statute. 529 U.S. 193, 195 (2000)
317. 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
318. Id. at 89-92.
319. See id at 93-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have considered
Green Tree's practice under the form contract and the financial inaccessibility of the arbitral forum
to Randolph).
320. See 532 U.S. 105, 112, 119 (2001) (stating that most courts of appeal limit the exclusion
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took a narrow construction of section 1 and limited its protections to
transportation workers. 32 1
As he had in Gilmer, Justice Stevens dissented, this time enjoying
support from Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter.322 As in Gilmer,
Justice Stevens reviewed the legislative history of the Act and
convincingly showed a congressional desire to protect workers subject to
contracts of adhesion that contain arbitration clauses.323 Although the
language of section 1 could have been broader, it not only singles out
seamen and railroad workers, but it includes the catchall of "any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"324language broad enough to encompass workers involved in nontransportation activities implicating interstate commerce. Early cases
construing section 1 took this view, and it was not until Tenney
Engineering, Inc. v. United Electrical & Machine Workers of America,
325
Local 437 that a contrary view arose in the circuits, creating a split at
the time of the Circuit City decision.
In addition to criticizing the majority's pre-arbitration reading of
section 1, Justice Stevens made a persuasive case that the majority
ignored both the congressional intent and legislative purpose underlying
the statute:
It is not necessarily wrong for the Court to put its own imprint on a
statute. But when its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text
enables it to disregard countervailing considerations that were
expressed by Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid

today, the Court misuses its authority. As the history of the legislation
indicates, the potential disparity in bargaining power between
individual employees and large employers was the source of organized

labor's opposition to the Act, which it feared would require courts to
enforce unfair employment contracts.... When the Court simply
ignores the interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its
interpretation with its own policy preferences.
... A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed,
and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a
provision to employees actually moving goods in interstate commerce and adopting this as the
appropriate interpretation); see supra text accompanying notes 270-84 (discussing Gilmer).
321. See CircuitCity, 532 U.S. at 119.
322. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. See id.at 125-29 (reviewing legislative history of section I of the Act).
324. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
325. 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1954); see Stempel, supra note 282 (providing a detailed description
of the case law of section 1 prior to Gilmer and Circuit City).
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court's own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the

very purpose for which a provision was enacted. That is the sad result
in this case.326
Justice Souter's dissent, also joined by the other three dissenters,
noted the difficult-to-defend inconsistency between the Court's broad
construction of section 2, which makes arbitration agreements
specifically enforceable save for contract-based revocation defenses, and
the Court's narrow construction of section 1 so as to limit employee
protection to only transportation workers.32 7
The dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Souter persuasively
argue that the Circuit City majority largely turned its back on legislative
history considerations in favor of reading statutory text in an unnatural
manner designed to implement the majority's policy preference for
328
In effect, the four dissenters
arbitration of employment disputes.
accuse the five Justices in the majority of spurning traditional statutory
interpretation jurisprudence that all of the majority judges-Justices
Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas-profess to
embrace, instead favoring imposition of the majority's personal
preferences for private ordering and reduced litigation.
After a period of relative quiet on the arbitration front, 32 9 the Court
returned to the issue in substantial, but confusing, fashion in 2003 with
the decision in Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle. 33 0 Reviewing state
court decisions permitting an arbitrator to accord class action treatment
326. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 133-35.
328. Id. at 131; id at 136 (Souter, J., dissenting).
329. The 2002-2003 time period broke the mold slightly with one decision favorable to workers
suffering discrimination. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Stevens, held that an arbitration agreement between an employee and his restaurant employer did not
bind the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from seeking relief in court for the
employee because the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration clause or its container contract. 534
U.S. 279, 297-98 (2002). Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, objected,
arguing that the Act required enforceability and that the EEOC was bound by the agreements made
by the plaintiffs whose causes it may take up in litigation. See id. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Two other decisions, however, continued to be highly supportive of arbitrability. In Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Court held that the meaning of a limitation provision in the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration Procedure was a matter to
be determined by the arbitrator rather than the court. 537 U.S. 79, 84-85 (2002). In Citizens Bank v.
Alafarbco, Inc., the Court's per curiam opinion followed Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v, Dobson,
holding that debt restructuring agreements made in Alabama between Alabama residents nonetheless
had a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to fall within the Act. Alafarbco, 539 U.S. 52,
55-56 (2003); Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court found agreements were contracts
evidencing a transaction involving commerce within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 56.
330. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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to homeowners contending that their commercial lender had violated the
South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, the Court vacated the South
Carolina high court's ruling, holding that although the Federal
Arbitration Act did not clearly preclude class arbitration, the matter
required more scrutiny according to state contract law. 33 1 The decision is
odd and seems not to accomplish much other than falling short of finding
a wholesale prohibition on class arbitration in the Act. To that extent, it
is not particularly indicative of either affection for or opposition to
arbitration. Surprisingly, the decision engendered dissents by Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,332 and Justice
Thomas, as well as a concurrence and dissent by Justice Stevens.334
Justice Stevens would have simply affirmed, in part because the
petitioner did not appear to preserve a challenge to this issue of whether
the state courts improperly decided a question of class arbitration that
Justice
should have been for the arbitrator in the first instance. 3
Thomas again reiterated his view that Southland was wrongly decided.336
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy thought reversal was the apt
remedy because the matter was one for the courts rather than the
arbitrator, and in their view, the contract in question did not permit class
arbitration, making the state court decision a violation of the federal
Act.337
D. The Roberts Court:A More Tainted Kind ofLove
From the uncertainty of Bazzle, the Court returned to more obvious
policy preference for arbitration in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna.3 In Buckeye, the Court addressed a variant of the Prima
Paint issue of allocation of initial interpretative authority between the
courts and arbitrators. 33 9 The Court held that the issue of whether an
allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration clause was illegal

331. See id at 453-54.
332. Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335. See id at 455.
336. See id at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
337. See id at 456 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
338. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
339. See id. at 444-45 (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967)); supranotes 142-43 and accompanying text (same).
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and thus void and unenforceable was for the arbitrator to decide, 34 0 a
result that can be justified under Prima Painteven if incorrect or unwise.
Buckeye is thus an example of continued affection for arbitration and a
desire to keep more dispute resolution activity before the arbitrator rather
than the courts. But it is not an outrageous example of the Court
swooning over arbitration. Justice Thomas was again a voice in the
wilderness, contending that the Act, if properly interpreted, applies only
in federal courts.341 Justice Alito did not participate.34 2
More obvious substantive favoritism of arbitration was reflected in
Preston v. Ferrer, in which the Court, with Justice Thomas in lone
dissent,34 3 held that the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes state law that
would in the absence of arbitration rest primary jurisdiction over a
dispute in an administrative forum.34 4 The Court viewed the state law
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies as a prerequisite to
arbitration as an obstacle to arbitration in conflict with the federal Act.345
Ironically, the case involved a dispute between a television "judge"
and his attorney/agent. 34 6 The judge sought to have the matter
determined by the California Labor Commissioner rather than an
arbitrator. 34 7 The California appellate court supported this request,
finding Buckeye Check Cashing inapposite because there had been no
question of primary administrative agency jurisdiction in Buckeye.3 4 8
The Court rejected the distinction in an opinion that continued the
Court's infatuation with arbitration but that was no more pro-arbitration
than the existing Prima Paintand Buckeye precedents.
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., arguably takes the proarbitration sentiment of the Court further by preventing parties to an
arbitration agreement from consensually expanding judicial review of
arbitration. 34 9 Hall Street held that parties to an arbitration agreement
could not stipulate to more searching judicial review of any resulting
340. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-47.
341. See id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 441 (majority opinion).
343. 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (restating the argument that the Act did
not apply in state court proceedings).
344. Id. at 349-51 (majority opinion).
345. See id. at 360-63.
346. Id.at 350.
347. Id. at 350-51.
348. See Ferrer v. Preston, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 628, 634 (Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 552 U.S. 346, 346
(2008).
349. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578.
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award, in particular de novo review of the arbitrator's legal
determinations rather than the more limited menu of grounds for vacating
an award set forth in section 10 of the Act. 350 The Court viewed this as
improper attempts by disputants to change the applicable law or to
attempt to control the courts.35 1
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer dissented.352 All essentially
argued that the Arbitration Act did not preclude agreements to enlarge
the scope of review. Justice Stevens noted that there was precedent
permitting such agreements prior to the Act and that neither the text nor
the legislative history of the Act suggested that Congress intended to
overturn these precedents.
Hall Street, however interesting, does not
give a clear signal regarding the Court's preferences for arbitration over
litigation. But the decision appears to strengthen the power of arbitration
by preventing judicial review in excess of that provided by section 10 of
the Act rather than protect the courts from litigants' efforts to control the
courts' discharge of statutory duty.
After two relatively minor decisions in 2009,354 the Court's
arbitration jurisprudence took increasingly wrong turns in 2010 and
2011. With Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds InternationalCorp., the
Court's recent arbitration jurisprudence became particularly problematic
and unsatisfying, in part because its romance with arbitration began to
appear fickle, or at least compromised of favoritism depending on who
was pursuing arbitration combined with a significant but unfounded
aversion to class action treatment of cases.355
In Stolt-Nielsen, a customer sought class action proceedings in its
arbitration with the shipper when accusing the shipper of illegal price

350. Id.at 586.
351. See id. at 590-92.
352. See id. at 592 (Stevens, J. and Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 596 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
353. See id. at 595 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, the Court held that judges may look through a petition to
compel arbitration to determine whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter rather than relying
solely on the averments of the petition. 556 U.S. 49, 53-54 (2009). Vaden is thus probably more of
a vindication of judicial authority than a reflection of arbitral infatuation. In ArthurAndersen LLP v.
Carlisle,the Court held that an entity or person not party to the underlying agreement containing an
arbitration clause nonetheless had standing to request a stay of court action on a matter pending in
arbitration. 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1903 (2009). By expanding standing to seek judicial relief in support
of arbitration, the decision continued the Court's tendency to embrace arbitration. Justice Souter, as
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens, dissented on grounds that the matter was not
ripe for appeal but appeared not to disagree with the majority's substantive decision regarding the
Federal Arbitration Act. See id. at 1903-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
355. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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fixing. 35 6 The arbitration clause of the shipping contract used broad
language, and no one contested that the matter was subject to
arbitration.357 But the shipper opposed class action treatment of the
The appointed arbitrators considered the issue and, after a
claim. 5
hearing, determined the parties should proceed with class treatment of
the case, though they stayed the proceedings pending judicial review.359
The federal district court vacated this "award" on the ground that the
arbitrators had shown "manifest disregard" of the law because they had
failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis. 3 60 The Second Circuit
reversed and reinstated the arbitration panel decision. 361 The Supreme
Court vacated the decision to proceed on a class basis, holding that class
treatment was improper absent sufficient proof that the shipper had
affirmatively consented to class action arbitration.3 62
Stolt-Nielsen, a relatively close 6-3 decision, could be viewed as
curtailing the Court's general affinity for arbitration. The decision has
the immediate practical effect of limiting an arbitration panel's power
over a dispute. But Stolt-Nielsen reflects not so much a cooling of
arbitral ardor as a revelation that the Court's love of arbitration is a
reckless and irresponsible affair. In most of the post-Southland cases,
the Court has given no serious consideration to issues of consent in the
formation of an arbitration agreement. But in Stolt-Nielsen, where the
party resisting broader arbitration held greater commercial power and the
relief requested would empower claimants, the Court was suddenly
gripped with concern over whether sufficient consent to arbitrate
existed.3 63
Perhaps the Court hates antitrust claimants or class action treatment
of disputes even more than it loves arbitration. But this hardly makes for
sound adjudication. Rather, it exposes the Court's own inconsistency
and favoritism. More sound and persuasive is Justice Ginsburg's dissent,
which Justices Stevens and Breyer joined.3 " In addition to making the
356. Id. at 1764-65.
357. See id. at 1765.
358. Id.
359. See id. at 1766.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See id. at 1767-68.
363. See id at 1773-75 (emphasizing "consensual nature of private dispute resolution" and that
"a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so").
364. See id at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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argument that the matter was not a final award subject to review under
section 10,365 the dissent took the sensible view that an arbitration
agreement ordinarily carries with it an agreement to arbitrate according
to whatever rules govern the proceeding as applied by the arbitrators:
Even if [the shipper] had a plea ripe for judicial review, the Court
should reject it on the merits. Recall that the parties jointly asked the
arbitrator to decide, initially, whether the arbitration clause in their
shipping contracts permitted class proceedings. The panel did just what
it was commissioned to do. It construed the broad arbitration clause
(covering "[a]ny dispute arising from the making, performance or
termination of this Charter Party," and ruled, expressly and only, that
the clause permitted class arbitration. The Court acts without warrant
in allowing Stolt-Nielsen essentially to repudiate its submission of the
contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and to gain, in place
of the arbitrators' judgment, this Court's de novo determination.
The controlling FAA prescription, § 10(a), authorizes a court to
vacate an arbitration panel's decision "only in very unusual
circumstances."366
As the dissent also accurately noted, the majority unfairly and
inaccurately characterized the arbitration panel decision as being one of
policy preference for class action treatment despite that the words
"policy" or "public policy" were "not so much as mentioned" by the
panel, which instead "tied its conclusion that the arbitration clause
permitted class arbitration" on contract language, historical practices,
applicable rules, and the record as informed by expert testimony. 3 6 7
"The question properly before the Court is not whether the
arbitrators' ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators 'exceeded
The arbitrators decided a
their powers' [under section 10(a)(4)].
threshold issue, explicitly committed to them, about the procedural mode
available for presentation of AnimalFeeds' antitrust claims."368 Making
365. See id. at 1778. The majority emphasized consent and noted that "a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
concluding that the party agreed to do so." Id. at 1774-75 (majority opinion). The dissent
responded by arguing that "[tlhe Court . . . does not persuasively justify judicial intervention so early
in the game, or convincingly reconcile its adjudication with the firm final-judgment rule prevailing
in the federal court system." Id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg additionally
noted that "[n]o decision of this Court, until today, has ever approved immediate judicial review of
an arbitrator's decision, as preliminary as the 'partial award' made in this case." Id. at 1779
(footnote omitted).
366. Id. at 1779-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
367. Seeid. at 1780-81.
368. Id. at 1781.
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good use of the Court's then-recent opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. that had permitted class action
litigation against an Erie challenge,3 69 the dissent, quoting Shady Grove,
noted that "'rules allowing multiple claims (and claims by or against
multiple parties) to be litigated together ... neither change plaintiffs'
separate entitlements to relief nor abridge defendants' rights; they alter
only how the claims are processed."' 3 70 The author of Shady Grove was
Justice Scalia, a member of the Stolt-Nielsen majority.37 1
Succinctly noting the logical flaw in the reasoning of the StoltNielsen majority, the dissent observed that "[fjor arbitrators to consider
whether a claim should proceed on a class basis, the Court apparently
demands contractual language one can read as affirmatively authorizing
class arbitration. The breadth of the arbitration clause, and the absence
of any provision waiving or banning class proceedings, will not do."372
But the law of arbitrability as set forth in the Court's pre-Stolt-Nielsen
cases of the modem era has been broad construction of broadly worded
arbitration agreements and the presumption that, unless stated to the
contrary, arbitration generally should be able to accord the same
remedies that are available in litigation.
As the dissent also noted, the right question in cases like StoltNielsen seeks "the proper default rule when there is no stipulation."3 73
Where industry-wide arbitration is the norm, one would logically expect
the dispute resolution norm to be one of according full remedies
commensurate with the dispute. And, as the dissent also noted "[w]hen
adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in
size, class proceedings may be 'the thin,' i.e., without them, potential
claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their
rights."3 74
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court was back in
unbridled pro-arbitration mode, holding that an arbitration clause
challenged as unconscionable by a former employee bringing a 42
U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination suit must first be assessed by the arbitrator
rather than the court. 375 The clause was broadly drafted, stating that the
369. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1781-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1763 (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 U.S. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1783.
Id. (citations omitted).
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2772-73 (2010).
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arbitrator, "and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have
exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation" of the agreement and was "not
limited to any claim that all or any part of [the agreement was] void or
voidable."376 But by reading the clause broadly and literally to preclude
judicial assessment of the fairness of the provision, the Court ignored the
very language of section 2 of the Act, which permits contract-based
claims for revocation of an arbitration agreement. 7
Coming less than two months after the Court's concern in StoltNielsen over whether a large shipping company had adequately
consented to class treatment of allegations that it had engaged in price
fixing, it is jarring to see little or no concern over the employee's consent
to a clause that sought to oust courts from even the jurisdiction left to
them by the drafters of the Act. Similarly odd is the Rent-A-Center
Court's willingness to permit this when only two years earlier it was
unwilling to permit the expanded judicial review of arbitration awards
sought by the contracting parties in Hall Street.37 8 The decisions seem
irreconcilable except by reference to a raw preference for arbitration with
limited judicial involvement-but, under Stolt-Nielsen, for piecemeal
arbitration of claims rather than class treatment.
The majority's reasoning is circular in that it prevents-until after an
award and a section 10 challenge to the award-judicial scrutiny of the
arbitration clause even though the worker's very argument is that the
clause suffers from procedural or substantive unconscionability.3 79 In
particular, the arbitration clause contained a fee-sharing provision that
the trial court determined was not substantively unconscionable and that
had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, with other unconscionability
arguments pending review when the Supreme Court intervened.38 o

376. Id at 2775.
377. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
378. Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 583 (2008). Three days after issuing Rent-A-Center, the Court in
GraniteRock Co. v. InternationalBrotherhoodofTeamsters, held that a dispute over the ratification
date of the collective bargaining agreement at issue was a matter for the court rather than an
arbitrator, that the employer did not implicitly consent to arbitration, and that a claim of tortious
interference fell outside the scope of the Labor Management Relations Act. 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2853,
2863-66 (2010). In dissent, Justices Sotomayor and Stevens argued that the CBA clearly directs
such issues to the arbitrator. See id. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
379. Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2774.
380. The trial court had found no substantive unconscionability as an alternative holding should
its determination that the issue was for the arbitrator be disturbed on review. Id. at 2776.
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The Rent-A-Center majority justified its holding as a natural
extension of Prima Paint and Buckeye, which both held that attacks on
contracts containing arbitration clauses are for the arbitrator because
such attacks do not question the validity of the arbitration clause. 38 1 But
allowing arbitrators to assess contract revocation defenses that do not
focus on arbitration is one thing. Allowing boilerplate arbitration
agreements imposed on employees, who would be free of such clauses
had the Court decided Gilmer or Circuit City correctly, is quite another.
With Rent-A-Center, the Court made a big move toward further
embracing arbitration. Under Rent-A-Center, it is not enough to require
judicial enforcement of arbitration clauses after judicial investigation
determines that they apply to the dispute and are not subject to a
revocation defense under section 2.382 Now, parties favoring arbitration,
even the highly problematic mass arbitration that was foreign to the
drafters of the Act, can remove courts from the inquiry altogether,
restricting the judicial role to its limited authority of policing arbitration
awards after the fact pursuant to the limited scope of section 10 of the
Act. That is, unless the Court takes an unjustifiably expansive view of
section 10, as it did in Stolt-Nielsen.
The pro-arbitration aggressiveness of Rent-A-Center engendered a 54 split in the Court.3 83 As in so many of the Court's arbitration decisions
of the past twenty years, the dissenting arguments appear more consistent
with statutory text, legislative intent and purpose, and deference to state
contract law.384 In addition, the dissent holds truer to judicial precedent:
The Court's decision today goes beyond Prima Paint. Its breezy
assertion that the subject matter of the contract at issue-in this case, an
arbitration agreement and nothing more-"makes no difference" is
simply wrong. This written arbitration agreement is but one part of a
broader employment agreement between the parties, just as the
arbitration clause in PrimaPaint was but one part of a broader contract
for services between those parties. Thus, that the subject matter of the

381. Id at 2778-80; see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006);
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); see also supra notes
142-43 and accompanying text (discussing Prima Paint); supra notes 338-42 and accompanying
text (discussing Buckeye).
382. Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2774.
383. Id.
384. See id. at 2781-88 (Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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agreement is exclusively arbitration makes all the difference in the

PrimaPaintanalysis.385

At least for the moment, the Court may have saved its worst for last.
Of the many problematic arbitration decisions that seem to run
roughshod over settled legal principles, AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion is by far the worst in its direct opposition to the Act's text,
legislative history, and architecture, and its disregard of the rights of the
states to regulate contracts. 386
Vincent and Lisa Concepcion purchased mobile phones subject to an
AT&T Mobility (AT&T) service contract. 387 And like most cell phone
service contracts, the AT&T contract provided for arbitration, including
the right of AT&T to "make unilateral amendments, which it did to the
arbitration provision on several occasions."3 88 The Concepcions brought
litigation alleging AT&T improperly charged $30.22 in sales tax on the
supposedly "free" phones they received as part of the service agreement,
a complaint that was consolidated with a putative class action alleging
fraud and false advertising because the company had advertised the
phones as "free" with a service agreement.389
AT&T in turn moved to compel arbitration of the claim. 39 0 The
Concepcions resisted, asserting "that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because
it disallowed classwide procedures." 3 9 1 Because the arbitration clause
forbade class action treatment of claims, the trial court and the Ninth
Circuit found it unconscionable under California law on the strength of
Discover Bank v. SuperiorCourt.392
Notwithstanding that Discover Bank and earlier class action
precedent such as Armendariz v. FoundationHealth PsychcareServices,
Inc.39 3 can be characterized as unconscionability decisions in which the
unreasonably unfair terms simply happened to be contained in an

385. Id. at 2781-82 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2782 (the question of arbitrability,
including defenses to arbitrability, is "an issue the FAA assigns to the courts").
386. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
387. Id. at 1744.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1745.
392. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (holding that
limitations on remedies such as a ban on class actions were unconscionable contract provisions)).
393. 6 P.3d 669, 771-72 (Cal. 2000).
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arbitration clause,394 the Concepcion majority specifically characterized
the California law as anti-arbitration law that was precluded by the Act:
The question in this case is whether § 2 preempts California's rule
classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable. We refer to this rule as the Discover Bank rule.

California courts have frequently applied this rule [that class action
waivers in consumer contracts that limit consumer remedies are
unconscionable] to find arbitration agreements unconscionable.
The Concepcion majority construed DiscoverBank to be a restriction

on arbitration rather than an unconscionability rule of which the AT&T
arbitration agreement ran afoul.

In doing so, it embraced the view of

critics who had opposed this application of California unconscionability
law. 9

The Court observed that:

The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of

§§ 2, 3, and

4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental

394. Id. Other state supreme court cases are consistent with Armendariz and Discover Bank in
finding some arbitration agreements unconscionable, not merely because they are arbitration
agreements, but because of some other unfairness in the contracting process or the terms of the
clause itself, such as lack of mutuality in the parties' access to remedies. See, e.g., Arnold v. United
Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998); Iwen v. U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 997
(Mont. 1999).
Some scholars have criticized this approach. See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Nonmutual
Agreements to Arbitrate, 27 I. J. CORP. L. 537, 547 (2002); Susan Randall, JudicialAttitudes Toward
Arbitrationand the Resurgence of Unconscionability,52 BUFF. L. REv. 185, 186-87 (2004). And it
appears that most states do not find unconscionability from nonmutuality alone so long as there was
sufficient consideration given to the party that lacks mutuality of remedies or procedural options.
See Allyson K. Kennett, Case Notes, Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams: Show Me
the Mutuality-A New Demand Based on an Old Doctrine Changes the Rules for Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements in Arkansas, 54 ARK. L. REv. 621, 631 (2001). But regardless of which
perspective is correct, it is unquestionable that the text of the Federal Arbitration Act itself places
authority for making this determination in the hands of the state whose contract law governs the
disputed arbitration clause. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
395. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
396. Id. at 1746-47.
397. See id (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
UnconscionabilityDoctrine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the FederalArbitration
Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, supranote 394, at 186-87).
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attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA.m

Beyond this formalistic but erroneous analysis-in error because it
misread the statutory language and congressional intent and purpose as
well as ignoring federalism concerns-the Concepcion majority could
not resist displaying its infatuation for arbitration as a mode of dispute
resolution differing from litigation.399 The opinion reads like an "Ode to
Arbitration," 400 at least so long as the arbitration is bilateral, limited in
scope, and not vested with too many of the leveling characteristics of
litigation such as class treatment, liberal joinder of parties, and broad
access to discovery.40 1
In particular, the majority saw the California unconscionability law
as a barrier that must be dismantled because arbitration works best when
bilateral and "is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation" by
"increas[ing] risks to defendants."4 0 2 Once again, the Court was
embracing arbitration when it served the interests of the business
establishment while also rebuking it as necessary to achieve the same
end. The Court was also embracing a view that class treatment of
arbitration is so threatening to defendants as to unfairly coerce
398. Id. at 1748.
399. See id. at 1748-49 (praising the efficiency of arbitration and generally supporting the Act).
400. See id. at 1748. The Court stated:
The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow for
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be specified, for
example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings
be kept confidential to protect trade secrets. And the informality of arbitral proceedings
is itself desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.
Id.at 1749.
401. See id at 1750-52. The Court, in analyzing the pros and cons of arbitration, remarked:
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different
procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And
while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the
class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the oftendominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties....
First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of
arbitration-its informality-and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment. ...
Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality....
We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of
these procedural requirements to an arbitrator. ...
Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants.. ..
Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.
Id.
402. See id. at 1751-52.
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settlement.40 3 Although this has long been a rallying cry of forces
opposing class actions, the most sophisticated scholarship on the topic
has largely debunked this view as a canard.404
In Concepcion, the dissenters reflect a stronger commitment to the
standard rules of adjudication and a more realistic picture of the practical
implications of the decision to which they object. In the main, however,
the dissenters are simply truer than the majority to both federalism
concerns and legislative intent and purpose:
The Discover Bank rule does not create a "blanket policy in
California against class action waivers in the consumer context."
Instead, it represents the "application of a more general
[unconscionability] principle." Courts applying California law have
enforced class-action waivers where they satisfy general
unconscionability standards. And even when they fail, the parties
remain free to devise other dispute mechanisms, including informal
mechanisms, that, in context, will not prove unconscionable.
The Discover Bank rule is consistent with the federal Act's
language.

...

The Discover Bank rule is also consistent with the basic "purpose
behind" the Act....
Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide procedural
and cost advantages....
But we have also cautioned against thinking that Congress'
primary objective was to guarantee these particular procedural
advantages. Rather, that primary objective was to secure the
"enforcement" of agreements to arbitrate.

... [C]lass arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration. It is a
form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed
elsewhere....
Where does the majority get its contrary idea-that individual,
rather than class, arbitration is a "fundamental attribut[e]" of
403. See id. at 1752 ("Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be
pressured into settling questionable claims.").
404. See, e.g., Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death": Class Certificationand Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357, 1359-60 (2003); Stempel, supra note 24, at 1128-29, 1227-30 (collecting
literature debating the degree of coercive force in class actions).
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arbitration? The majority does not explain. And it is unlikely to be
able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute
itself.

The majority's related claim that the Discover Bank rule will
discourage the use of arbitration because "[a]rbitration is poorly suited
to ... higher stakes" lacks empirical support....
Further, even though contract defenses, e.g., duress and
unconscionability, slow down the dispute resolution process, federal
arbitration law normally leaves such matters to the States....
Because California applies the same legal principles to address the
unconscionability of class arbitration waivers as it does to address the
unconscionability of any other contractual provision, the merits of class
proceedings should not factor into our decision. If California had
applied its law of duress to void an arbitration agreement, would it
matter if the procedures in the coerced agreement were efficient?

Finally, the majority can find no meaningful support for its views
in this Court's precedent. The federal Act has been in force for nearly a
century. We have decided dozens of cases about its requirements. We
have reached results that authorize complex arbitration procedures. We
have upheld nondiscriminating state laws that slow down arbitration
proceedings. But we have not, to my knowledge, applied the Act to
strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial
and administrative proceedings.
At the same time, we have repeatedly referred to the Act's basic
objective as assuring that courts treat arbitration agreements "like all

other contracts."

And we have recognized that "[t]o immunize an

arbitration agreement from judicial challenge" on grounds applicable to
all other contracts "would be to elevate it over other forms of

contract."405
The dissenters, like the majority, also could not resist a public policy
argument. But at least the public policy of the dissenters recognizes the
realities of small claims practice and the potential for class treatment to
level the playing field upon which larger, wealthier, repeat-player
institutional litigants contend with largely unorganized individuals of
405. Id. at 1757-61 (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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modest means.40 6 More important in terms of the mainstream rules of
jurisprudence, the dissent reflects the type of respect for traditional state
contract law prerogatives reflected in the text of the Act and its
legislative history:
What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the
Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a
$30.22 claim? In California's perfectly rational view, nonclass
arbitration over such sums will also sometimes have the effect of
depriving claimants of their claims (say, for example, where claiming
the $30.22 were to involve filling out many forms that require technical
legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call is placed on
hold). Discover Bank sets forth circumstances in which the California
courts believe that the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated
to insulate an agreement's author from liability for its own frauds by
"deliberately cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money." Why is this kind of decision-weighing the
cons of all class proceedings alike-not California's to
pros and
make?407
Emphasizing the advantages of their legislative intent and purpose
argument, the dissenters noted that Congress was quite clear that in
passing the Act: it focused on merchants acting "under the customs of
their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent

bargaining power." 4 08
Although the dissent hews considerably closer to mainstream
approaches to statutory construction and to the text and legislative intent
of the Act than does the majority, the majority was able to put together
an argument based on precedent because the Court's arbitration decisions
of the prior thirty years had steadily moved away from fidelity to
statutory text, legislative intent, the purpose of the Act, and concern for
values of consent and fairness in contracting.
While lacking much support in the Act's text or legislative
background,4 09 the Concepcion majority was nonetheless able to put
406. See id
407. Id. at 1761 (citations omitted).
408. See id. at 1759 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 646 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); J Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 before the
Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary,67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9-10 (1923); Press Release, Dep't
of Commerce, Secretary Hoover Favors Arbitration (Dec. 28, 1925) (on file with the Herbert Hoover
Presidential Library); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12
VA. L. REv. 265, 281 (1926)).
409. The Concepcion majority's efforts to support its holding based on modem Court precedent
is rather well done, presuming one reads the majority's selective summary and quotation of
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together a plausible attack on California's approach to unconscionability
analysis of arbitration agreements based on decades of case law that had
gradually undermined these mainstream bases for construing the Act.410
Brick by brick, the Court had erected an edifice of arbitration quite
different than Congress intended. Through relatively steady incremental
"slouching" away from the core of the original Act and "bootstrapping"
upon the rhetorical excesses of each case expanding the Act and
diminishing controls on mandated mass arbitration,4 11 the Court by 2011
had effectively judicially rewritten the Act into something fitting the
majority's policy preferences.
Incredibly, the Concepcion majority was horrified at the prospect of
class-wide administration of arbitration but saw no problems with the
world of mass, mandatory arbitration the Court had created over the past
precedent in a vacuum divorced from the actual background history of the Act and the Court's first
fifty years of adjudicating disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act. The majority's direct contact
with the background of the statute, however, takes on an almost ludicrous tone. For example, the
majority criticizes the dissent's assessment of the statute as focused on commercial arbitration
among merchants as "[rielying upon nothing more indicative of congressional understanding than
statements of witnesses in committee hearings and a press release of Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover." Id. at 1749 n.5.
This is a little unfair to the dissent, which implicitly considers the entire background of the Act
even if it only quotes certain material and grossly mischaracterizes the full genesis of the Act.
Scholars investigating the Act have agreed with the dissent's viewpoint that the enacting Congress
envisioned an Act specifically enforcing the type of arbitration agreements found in merchants'
commercial contracts of the time and not the type of mandated mass consumer arbitration at issue in
Concepcion. See HUBER & WESTON, supra note 104, at 9-11 (providing background on the
derivation of the Act); Stempel, supra note 104, at 277-82; see also 1 MACNEIL, SPEIDEL &
STIPANOWICH, supra note 240 §§ 8:1-8:2 (reviewing the Act's background and legislative history).
410. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746, 1749 (asserting that the Act reflects "'a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies
to the contrary' (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983))); id. at 1747 (stating that "a court may not 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable"' (quoting
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987))); id. at 1748 (noting that "[t]he 'principal purpose'
of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms'
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989))); id. at 1749 ("Contrary to the dissent's view, our cases place it beyond dispute that the FAA
was designed to promote arbitration. They have repeatedly described the Act as 'embod[ying] [a]
national policy favoring arbitration' .....
(alterations in original) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))); id. (stating that requiring the exhaustion of
administrative remedies prior to arbitration frustrates the purpose of the Act and "'hinder[s] speedy
resolution of the controversy"' (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357-58 (2008))); id. at
1750-51 (criticizing class treatment of disputes as inconsistent with the Act (citing Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds, Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773-76 (2010))); id. at 1753 (stating that the
California contract doctrine of unconscionability "'stands as obstacle to the ... purposes and
objectives of Congress' expressed in the Act (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941))).
411. See Stempel, Bootstrapping andSlouching, supra note 11.
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three decades.412 One might ascribe this to jurisprudential myopia, but it
seems more likely that the Concepcion majority disliked the former
because of its leveling effect between the more and less powerful
disputants but embraced the latter because of its inequality-enhancing
traits. The arbitration decisions of the Roberts Court line up too neatly in
favor of the economically and politically more powerful disputants to be
the product of mere inadvertence.
The Concepcion majority was so intent on striking down California's
use of the authority provided in section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
that it exhibited a truly embarrassing moment of judicial amnesia. After
criticizing California's Discover Bank doctrine of unconscionability as
unduly targeted against arbitration, the Concepcion majority observed
that "[o]f course States remain free to take steps addressing the concerns
that attend contracts of adhesion-for example, requiring class-actionwaiver provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be
highlighted." 413 The problem, of course, is that the Court prohibited just
this type of state disclosure statute in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto.4 14 The Montana law struck down in Casarottorequired that
arbitration provisions in franchise contracts be noted in underlined
capital letters.4 15 That actual state law pretty closely resembles the
hypothetical state disclosure law suggested by the Concepcion Court as
an acceptable policing alternative to Discover Bank's unconscionability
doctrine. If anything, the Montana statute would seem less of a
disclosure burden than highlighting class action waiver provisions as
suggested by the Concepcion majority. 4 16
412. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746-53 (citing case law from 1983 to 2006 in support of its
decision).
413. See id. at 1750 n.6.
414. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
415. See id. at 683. The Montana law provided that that "[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to
arbitration .. . [shall be] typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." Id.
(first alteration in original) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) An arbitration clause not meeting this provision was rendered unenforceable under
Montana law. Id. at 684.
416. Note 6 of Concepcion is unclear regarding whether a state could make the violation of an
apparently permissible state statute requiring the highlighting of a class action waiver grounds for
refusing to enforce the arbitration clause or the class action limitations of the clause. See 131 S. Ct.
at 1750 n.6. Such was the penalty in Montana for violation of the arbitration disclosure provision at
issue in Casarotto. States frequently refuse to enforce contract terms where there have been
violations of disclosure requirements. But reading Casarotto as a whole suggests the Court was
concerned that not only was the required disclosure singling out and burdening arbitration, but that
the statute had an excessively draconian penalty for failing to provide the required disclosure that the
contract contained an arbitration clause. See 517 U.S. at 687 ("Courts may not, however, invalidate
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Was the Concepcion majority unaware of Casarotto,a decision only
fifteen years old that involved four members of the Concepcion Court,
three in the majority? 4 17 Impossible. The same Concepcion majority
suggesting that states respond to its holding with legislation similar to
that struck down in Casarottohad just cited Casarattoa mere four pages
earlier concerning the types of state contract rules that fell within the
purview of section 2 of the Act.4 18
But being aware of a precedent and appreciating its meaning are two
different things. A Court with its wits about it would at least have
addressed the inconsistency of Concepcion note 6 and Casarotto. But
the Concepcion majority failed to do so, and the Concepcion dissent did
not address this error by the majority.41 9 One can make attempts to
distinguish Casarotto and Concepcion, but any attempted distinction
seems doomed to unpersuasiveness. 4 20 How can a requirement of
minimally adequate disclosure of arbitration in a franchise agreement
violate the Act while a requirement of forced disclosure of the limitations
on class actions in an arbitration clause complies with the Act? 4 2 1

arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions." (citation omitted));
id. at 687-88 (highlighting the Court's concern over state laws which invalidate arbitration clauses
in general); see also supranotes 311-15 and accompanying text.
417. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer were all members of both the
CasarottoCourt and the Concepcion Court. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1743.
418. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 ("This saving clause [of section 2 of the Act] permits
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by 'generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
duress, or unconscionability,' but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue." (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at
687)).
419. The Concepcion dissent cited Casarotto only in passing in a string citation for the
proposition that that Court's precedents "have repeatedly referred to the Act's basic objective as
assuring that courts treat arbitration agreements 'like all other contracts."' Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1761 (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (gathering cases).
420. See Concepcion, 131 U.S. at 1750 n.6 (majority opinion). One sentence after inviting
California to consider legislation similar to the Montana statute struck down in Casarotto, the Court
cautioned that "[s]uch steps cannot, however, conflict with the FAA or frustrate its purpose to ensure
that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms." Id. Trying to be fair to
the majority, one could seize upon this last sentence as a means of distinguishing Casarottofrom the
type of hypothetical state disclosure legislation that the Concepcion majority appears to be
suggesting as a substitute for the Discover Bank approach to unconscionability. But, a reasonably
neutral observer could not regard such a proffered distinction as persuasive.
421. If the Concepcion Court meant what it wrote in note 6, then the type of state disclosure
regulation seemingly approved therein could significantly mitigate the potential unfairness of
mandatory mass arbitration. In light of Concepcion's seeming obliviousness to the conflict between
note 6 and Casarotto, however, state legislatures will probably be reluctant to follow the Court's
suggestion.
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Thomas stakes out a strained
position, one that is particularly surprising coming from the Justice who
had until recently continued to argue that Southland was wrongly
422
decided and that the Federal Act did not apply in state court.
According to Justice Thomas, Discover Bank's brand of
unconscionability could not thwart the arbitration sought by AT&T
because it "does not relate to defects in the making of the agreement.A 2 3
Surely this view is incorrect, because section 2 of the Act speaks of any
contract doctrine that relates to revocation. A contract can be revocable
for infirmities other than those going directly to the contracting process.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUATION OF THE AFFAIR

Looking back on nearly thirty years of Supreme Court affection for
arbitration, the record is not a particularly attractive one for proponents
of the rule of law or fans of constrained judging that does not unduly
reflect the personal political, social, economic, and ideological
preferences of the bench.
For the most part, the Court has been caught up in the same
uncritical support for arbitration that society has shown during the same
time period. Business is in vogue while government is out of favor.424
Litigation is considered wasteful while private ordering is revered.425
422. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note
333 (discussing Justice Thomas's traditional view that the Federal Arbitration Act governed actions
in federal court but did not set forth substantive law applicable in state court).
423. See id.
424. See JEFF MADRICK, THE CASE FOR BIG GOVERNMENT 1 (2009) ("It is conventional wisdom
in America today that high levels of taxes and government spending diminish America's prosperity.
The claim strikes a deep intuitive chord, not only among those on the Right, but also among many on
today's Left. It has become so obvious to so many over the last thirty years, it hardly seems to
require demonstration any longer. It is apparently so widely accepted by the public and rolls off the
tongues of policymakers from both parties with such fluency that one would think the evidence
needn't even be gathered."); Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Faith in Government Plummets, Research
Says, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2012, at 6 ("The public's faith in government has dropped sharply around
the world in the past year, giving businesses a rare opportunity to seize the global agenda.. .. [I]n
every country, government leaders were more distrusted than business chiefs."); Elizabeth Mendes,
In U.S., Fear of Big Government at Near-Record Level, GALLUP.COM (Dec. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/151490/fear-big-government-near-record-level.aspx("Two in three
Americans (64%) say big government will be the biggest threat to the country, one percentage point
lower than the record high, and more than twice the number who say the same about big business
(26%).").
425. See Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1266-67 (2005) ("Starting in the 1970s, large sections of business embraced
beliefs and prescriptions about the legal system that, for want of a name, I have called the 'jaundiced
view.' By this I refer to the view that America is enmeshed in a 'litigation explosion' that is
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Arbitration is enforced even under circumstances where reasonable
persons might wonder about the degree of assent to boilerplate
arbitration clauses in standardized contracts of adhesion.
Courts-particularly the Supreme Court-have tended to view
arbitration as if it were still the type of guild-like expert resolution
among merchants that animated support for the 1925 Federal Act while
ignoring the degree to which post-Southland forms of mass consumer
arbitration have moved far away from the original congressional intent
and purpose. But to a large degree, the Court, when dealing with
arbitration, has refused to bind itself to the type of textualism and
originalism it ordinarily embraces in matters of statutory construction.
The Court's modern arbitration jurisprudence imposed a judicial
evolution of the Act in which the statute morphed from one shielding the
commercial contracts of merchants from overt judicial hostility into a
statute allegedly enshrining a "liberal" and "national policy" in favor of
arbitration so strong that-in spite of the language of section 2 of the
Act-state contract law regulating the arbitration contracting process is
largely preempted by the Act, even when applied to a variety of
mandatory mass arbitration far afield from the dispute resolution
envisioned by the enacting Congress.
In the process, the Court has been willing to ignore seemingly clear
statutory text favorable to workers resisting mandatory arbitration of jobrelated disputes and to view traditional state contract regulation as some

unraveling the nation's social fabric and undermining the economy. . . . In the jaundiced view, trials
are not only expensive, but risky because juries are arbitrary, sentimental, and 'out of control.' This
view reinforces strategies of settlement to avoid trial.") According to Galanter, "[w]hile confidence
in adjudication and courts has declined, the courts, politicians, and business elites have embraced
ADR." Id. at 1268; accord, Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984-85 (2003) ("Critics maintain that excessive and
frivolous litigation overwhelms the judicial system's capacity to administer speedy and efficient
justice, leads to higher costs for litigants and society at large, and even hinders America's
competitive position in the global economy.... Civil litigation has long been criticized as costly and
inefficient."); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 475 (2004) ("Critics of the current system
frequently present alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as an all-purpose prescription.").
Anti-litigation sentiment has been in ascendency for some time. See Marc Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 5 (1986) ("A phalanx of moumful and indignant
commentators concur that America is in the throes of a litigation crisis requiring urgent attention
from policymakers."); see also WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 2 (1991)
(describing the "unleashing of litigation" that "clogs and jams the gears of commerce, sowing
friction and distrust between the productive enterprises on which material progress depends and all
who buy their products, work at their plants and offices, join in their undertakings").
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sort of insurgency threatening federal power and the core of U.S.
business.
This kind of adjudication is far removed from the traditional judicial
commitment to fair reading of the text, close attention to legislative
intent and purpose, and respect for traditional state authority. Even
without considering the practical David versus Goliath aspects of many
arbitration disputes and the practical consequences of enforced private
ordering, the Court's arbitration jurisprudence has been so disappointing
as to suggest undue infatuation with arbitration.
But in selected cases, the Court has been willing to disparage at least
some aspects of some arbitrations,4 26 when necessary to prevent it from
benefitting consumers or less powerful commercial actors. The Court
has also been willing to permit mass-contract drafters wide latitude to
arrogate to the arbitrator the traditional judicial role of assessing whether
an arbitration agreement even covers the parties' dispute 4 2 7 but has been
unwilling to permit contracting parties to agree to subject arbitration
awards to more searching scrutiny than provided by section 10.428
Perhaps the Court loves some things-for example, litigants with
more money, power, or leverage-even more than it admires arbitration.
Or perhaps it hates some things-for example, class actions, consumer
demands, assertion of "anti-business" remedial legislation or common
law-enough to restrict arbitration in some cases. But neither of these
reasons provides any better justification for the Court's disappointing
case law about arbitration than the Court's demonstrated infatuation with
the arbitration mechanism.
True to this depressing form, the Court ushered in 2012 with yet
another poorly reasoned valentine to arbitration in CompuCreditCorp. v.
Greenwood, holding that "right to sue" and non-waiver provisions of the
Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) 429 did not preclude
enforcement of a boilerplate mass arbitration clause. 43 0 Distressingly,
only Justice Ginsburg dissented, 4 3 1 although Justices Sotomayor and

426. See supra text accompanying notes 355-74 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen and class-wide
resolution of claims).
427. See supratext accompanying notes 375-85 (discussing Rent-A-Center and the expansion of
arbitrators' authority).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 349-53 (discussing Hall Street and the inability of a
contract to expand the scope ofjudicial scrutiny of arbitrations).
429. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006).
430. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669-71 (2012).
431. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Kagan in concurring opinions viewed the issue as "a much closer case
than the majority opinion suggests.'A32
CROA, passed in 1996, responded to a perceived problem of abusive
lending and was designed to protect consumers dealing with "credit
repair" lenders, in particular credit card companies that issued low-limit
credit cards to persons with poor credit history.433 The limited options
and sophistication of these bad-credit-risk consumers logically made
them particularly vulnerable to predatory lending agreements.434
CompuCredit itself provided an almost textbook example of the
potential for abuse of such credit card issuance. Plaintiff Greenwood
was issued an "Aspire Visa" credit card marketed by CompuCredit and
issued by a bank. 4 35 Greenwood's complaint alleged that:
CompuCredit's promotional materials told potential customers that no
deposit would be required, and that cardholders would receive, upfront,
a credit line of $300. In fact, plaintiffs asserted, they were charged an
initial finance fee of $29, a monthly fee of $6.50, and an annual fee of
$150, assessed immediately against the $300 limit. In the aggregate,
Plaintiffs calculated, fees charged the first year amounted to $257.
When Greenwood sued and sought class action treatment of the case, she
was confronted with the broad-based arbitration clause used in an
"enclosed insert" to the application materials, which provided for
arbitration before the controversial National Arbitration Forum (NAF)
that has since been forced from this segment of the arbitration market by
a state attorney general's action.437
CROA mandates certain disclosures by card marketers such as
CompuCredit, including a statement to the consumer that "[y]ou have a
right to sue"A3 s and also makes void "[a]ny waiver by any consumer of
any protection provided by or any right of the consumer" under the
law. 4 39 Continuing the Court's departure from the normal rules of
statutory construction when faced with a challenge to arbitration, the
432. Id. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
433. See Andrew T. Schwenk, A Beast ofBurden Without Any Reins, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1165,
1180-81 (2011).
434. See id.
435. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 667.
436. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
437. See id at 677 nn. 1-2; supra note 102 (discussing the NAF's settlement with the Minnesota
Attorney General).
438. See 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2006).
439. See § 1679f.
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Court ruled that the "right to sue" disclosure did not literally mean what
it said and meant only a right to make a claim-which could in turn be
subject to a forum selection clause like an arbitration agreement, even
one found in a package insert to an adhesion contract designating a
tribunal thought by many to be stacked against consumers.440
Only a half-year after its controversial and much-criticized 5-4 split
in Concepcion,"' the Court returned with a vengeance to supporting
arbitration, even in the face of seemingly contrary statutory directives
and problematic "consent" to an arbitration provision that severely
limited the opportunity for vindication of small claims. But perhaps even
worse, the Court's latest embrace of arbitration spurred only one
dissenting vote.4 2 However tainted, the Court's love for arbitration
continues unabated.

440. See 131 S. Ct. at 669-70. The majority attempted to bolster its argument by noting that
Congress has in other instances used more express language precluding arbitration and posited that,
by 1996, Congress was well aware of concerns about mandatory arbitration. See id at 672 (majority
opinion) (citing Ware, supra note 315).
The majority also relied on cases that refused to apply a "statutory exception" to arbitration,
id, but none of the statutes involved in those cases contained nonwaiver provisions, a point well
made by the dissent. See id. at 679 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
441. Battles continue over Concepcion. See Scott Graham, AT&T Mobility Doesn'tApply in the
Workplace, Says NLRB, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 9, 2012, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/
PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202537751118 ("NLRB member Craig Becker joined chairman Mark Gaston
Pearce (both Obama appointees to the Board) to hold that class action waivers don't belong in the
workplace, and that requiring them as a condition of employment is an unfair labor practice. The
Board's sole Republican member, Brian Hayes, was recused for undisclosed reasons.").
442. Media reports of the CompuCredit decision not only portrayed the vote as lopsided and the
result as uncontroversial, but they generally failed to discuss Justice Ginsburg's dissenting rationale
and counter statement regarding statutory text,. structure, and purpose. See, e.g., Debra Cassens
Weiss, Supreme Court Upholds Arbitration Provision in Credit Card Contract, A.B.A. J., Jan. 10,
2012, available at http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/supreme-courtupholds-arbitration_
provisionincredit card contract (reporting that Justice "Ginsburg was the only dissenter");
Supreme Court Upholds Credit Card Arbitration Clauses, INS. J., Jan. 12, 2012, available at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/01/12/230946.htm (same).
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